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ii glossary
explanaTiOn OF TerMs used in This repOrT
Board of Directors: The board of directors is the highest decision-making forum of an 
organisation, whether it is a private company or State-owned body. Boards typically comprise both 
executive members and non-executive members, with different roles assigned to each.
CEO: The Chief Executive Officer is essentially in charge of the company on a day-to-day basis, 
setting out policy and bearing responsibility for results. CEOs are typically ex-officio members of 
the board of directors in the private sector, although this varies in State-owned bodies.
Chairperson: The chairperson of the board is typically a non-executive director charged with 
guiding and facilitating the board of directors in carrying out its duties.
Combined Code on Corporate Governance: The current framework of Corporate Governance 
for listed companies is that outlined by the Finance Reporting Council (FRC) in the UK. The Irish 
Stock Exchange requires its listed companies to follow the UK Code. The Combined Code operates 
on a ‘comply or explain’ basis rather than mandatory adherence; that is, in their annual reports, 
companies are expected to provide a justification and explanation for any deviation in their 
activities from the provisions of the Code.
Corporate Governance: The framework of rules and practices by which a board of directors 
directs an organisation. This includes the board’s role in ensuring accountability, fairness and 
transparency in the firm’s relationship with all its stakeholders.
Cross-Directorships: While sometimes used to mean the same thing as holding multiple 
directorships, this report takes the more specific definition of cross-directorships as meaning a 
situation where a director from company A becomes a member of the board of company B, and a 
different director from company B becomes a director of company A.
Director Network: This term is developed in the report to refer to the existence of a small 
number of directors in 40 of Ireland’s top private companies and State-owned bodies who hold 
multiple directorships on the boards of these 40 organisations. Within the Director Network, a 
smaller group of the eleven most well-connected directors is also identified on the basis of the 
extent of their links to other directors and/or organisations in the study.
Executive Directors: Members of the executive management of a company, responsible for its 
day-to-day running. Frequently, a number of executive directors serve on the board in addition to 
the CEO.
‘Groupthink’: This is a well-recognised psychological phenomenon that occurs when small 
groups are involved in making decisions. Groupthink is when conclusions are reached and/or 
decisions are made, which ignore alternative or contrary evidence, as a result of a group’s desire 
to reach consensus. A major contributing factor to groupthink is where group members all, or 
mostly, come from similar backgrounds.
Higgs Review: A detailed UK report outlining the expected role and conduct of non-executive 
directors, published in 2003.
iii
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Independence of Non-Executive Directors: Some, if not all, non-executive directors are 
expected to be independent of the organisation on the board of which they are a member. 
Sample criteria for independence include having no family or personal ties to members of the 
organisation’s executive, having no business ties to the organisation, and not having been an 
employee of the organisation in the past.
Interlocking Boards: This report develops this term to refer to the situation where the board of 
directors of two organisations are linked through the presence of one or more directors who sit on 
both boards simultaneously. 
‘Light Touch’ Regulation: A system of rules that avoids legal requirements and sanctions for 
company compliance and hence relies to a large degree on voluntary codes and/or ‘self-regulation’.
Multiple Directorships: Simultaneously holding two or more directorships in separate 
companies.
Non-Executive Director: Non-executive directorships are usually part-time positions on the 
board of a company and, as the name implies, do not have executive management responsibilities. 
Non-executive directors are charged with defending the interests of the organisation and its 
stakeholders by providing an independent perspective and advice to the executive of the company 
as well as scrutinising their actions.
Public Interest: We define the public interest as the well-being of the general public, including 
marginalised sub-groups, and ensuring that the actions of organisations in the economy and 
society promote this well-being, or at least do not negatively impinge upon it.
Public Interest Companies: The term ‘public interest companies’ is a label applied to private 
companies and State-owned bodies whose effect on the economy is sufficiently large that their 
actions are considered to be of significant public interest.
‘Shareholder Value’: One way of measuring a company’s value is in terms of its net present 
value; that is, by subtracting its debts from certain of its assets. According to proponents of 
shareholder value, any ‘surplus’ value should accrue exclusively to shareholders.
Stakeholders: Stakeholders are all of those with a ‘stake’ or interest in the activities and results 
generated by an organisation. Example stakeholders include customers, employees, shareholders 
and the wider public who may be affected by an organisation’s actions.
Short-Termism: A perspective that emphasizes short-term growth and/or profit over long-term 
impacts on the performance of an organisation.
Top 40 Companies: This report focuses on 26 private companies and 14 State-owned bodies 
which were identified as important to the Irish economy.
Walker Review: A review of Corporate Governance structures in the UK’s financial sector in the 
aftermath of the banking crisis, published in November 2009.
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iv report summary
• A network of 39 individuals held powerful positions in 33 of 40 top public organisations and 
private Irish businesses in three of the critical Celtic Tiger years (2005-2007), and held more 
than 93 directorships between them in these companies during this period; as well as an 
average of ten directorships each in other companies.
• Focused on the years 2005-2007, the research shows that each of the 39 members of this 
‘Director Network’ held multiple directorships on at least two boards across 33 of the 40 
companies concerned.
• More than a quarter (eleven) of the 39 members of the Director Network were particularly 
well-connected. They had ten or more links, via these multiple directorships, to other 
members of this Network and/or sat on three, four or even five boards of the top 40 companies 
simultaneously.
• In addition to holding multiple directorships, a significant proportion of the Director Network 
held very senior full-time positions, either as CEOs or executive directors or equivalent 
positions.
• Over half of the members of the Director Network held board positions in at least one of 
Ireland’s four largest financial institutions: Anglo Irish Bank, AIB, Bank of Ireland and Irish 
Life and Permanent. The three most tightly-interwoven of all 40 boards were all financial 
institutions.
• The two major issues arising from the research are:
 - The degree to which holding multiple functions and responsibilities may militate against 
the necessary attention required by any individual business or activity;
 - The implications of a concentration of directorial responsibilities for the independence of 
boards and for corporate governance generally.
• The research demonstrates a significant lack of diversity among members of the Director 
Network; for example, only one in nine directors was a woman. Severe gender imbalance and 
similarities in world view and experience may lead to persistent ‘groupthink’; that is decision-
making that ignores alternative evidence as a result of a group’s desire to reach consensus. One 
major contributing factor to this is where group members all come from similar backgrounds.
•  The research found a trend of excessive remuneration; for example in 2005-2007 
remuneration for the CEOs of both private companies and State-owned bodies increased by 
more than 40 per cent on average, while inflation was at 9.1 per cent for both years combined.
• The problems of corporate governance identified by the research signal that Ireland cannot 
afford to go back to ‘business as usual’. The report argues that a new, statutory framework is 
required to ensure good corporate governance in private companies and State-owned bodies. 
This report outlines a number of elements of such a system which would shift the focus from 
the failed notion of ‘shareholder value’ to real stakeholder involvement.
1. Overview
11. Overview
1.1 In Ireland as elsewhere, sudden economic decline combined with the dramatic collapse 
of the banking system has focused attention on ‘a golden circle’, a small number of board 
directors (and others), operating at the highly lucrative apex of Irish business. A strong 
perception existed well before the present economic crisis that Ireland is run by a small 
pool of well-connected individuals sitting on the boards of Ireland’s top companies. 
Focusing primarily on the years 2005-2007, this research briefing tests this perception with 
regard to a group of 40 top companies. The research examined the annual reports of 26 
private companies, all but two of which are quoted on the Irish Stock Exchange, and 14 of 
the most economically-important State-owned bodies. We find that there is a small group 
of 39 individuals who held multiple directorships in these 40 companies. Over three-
quarters of the companies under review had Interlocking Boards; that is these companies 
had directors who were members of two or more boards simultaneously.
The evidence shows:
•	 A	‘Director	Network’	of	39	individuals	who	held	multiple	directorships	on	at	least	two	boards	
across	33	of	the	40	companies	examined;
•	 These	represented	one	in	14	(seven	per	cent)	of	the	total	group	of	directors	serving	on	these	
boards	during	the	period	under	review;
•	 A	group	of	eleven	directors	were	the	most	well-connected;	that	is,	they	had	the	most	number	of	
links	to	other	directors	and/or	they	sat	on	three,	four	or	even	five	boards	simultaneously.
1.2 The first of two major issues that arises when the question of multiple directorships is 
considered is that directors may find themselves to be overextended and perhaps unable 
to give the necessary attention to any individual business or activity as a consequence of 
holding multiple functions and responsibilities.
 The evidence shows:
•	 The	39	members	of	the	Director	Network	had	more	than	93	directorships	between	them	on	the	
33	Interlocking	Boards;
•	 On	average	each	was	a	member	of	the	board	of	ten	other	companies	outside	the	40	top	
companies;
•	 The	total	number	of	these	additional	directorships	was	398;
•	 A	significant	proportion	of	the	Director	Network	held	senior	full-time	positions	either	as	CEOs,	
executive	directors	or	equivalent.
1.3 The second major issue is that of directors’ independence. The question of directors’ 
independence is difficult to assess. However, the extent of multiple directorships found 
and the linkages that these generate is such that there is a risk that board members’ 
loyalties may be divided between the different bodies on whose boards they sit.
 The evidence shows:
•	 Through	a	relatively	small	number	of	individuals,	more	than	four	out	of	five	(80	per	cent)	of	the	
top	40	companies	were	directly	linked;
•	 On	average,	each	of	the	40	top	companies	was	linked	via	shared	directors	to	three	or	four	other	
top	companies;
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2 •	 In	2007,	close	to	a	quarter	(23	per	cent)	of	non-executive	directorships	in	the	33	Interlocking	
Boards	were	held	by	the	Director	Network.
1.4 Separate from the issue of multiple directorships is the potential problem of lack of 
diversity among board directors. Similarities in world view and experience risk persistent 
‘groupthink’ which may diminish willingness to challenge decisions and may lead to a 
failure to understand and protect either the shareholders or the wider public interest. 
Members of the Director Network share a similar social and business background as do 
both the executives of the companies on whose boards they sit and their fellow directors.
 The evidence shows:
•	 In	particular,	women	are	significantly	under-represented	on	the	boards	of	these	leading	
companies:	just	one	in	nine	(11	per	cent)	of	the	572	directors	of	the	40	top	companies	was	a	
woman;
•	 The	position	was	worse	in	the	private	sector,	where	only	one	in	14	directors	was	a	woman	
(seven	per	cent);
•	 Women’s	representation	on	boards	was	higher	in	the	public	sector,	where	one	in	five	were	
directors	(18	per	cent);
•	 The	Government’s	guideline	is	for	women	to	occupy	40	per	cent	of	board	positions	on	State	
boards.	Thus	women’s	representation	on	the	14	most	economically-important	boards	falls	far	
short;
•	 All	the	available	evidence	shows	a	lack	of	diversity	across	other	characteristics,	such	as	social	
background,	occupation	and	age.
1.5 The Irish business environment, exemplified by a culture of excessive risk taking in key 
sectors, together with a system of so-called ‘light touch’ regulation, helped to foster a 
weak and inadequate system of corporate governance. Some of the resulting failures have 
contributed to the economic crisis in Ireland. A key contributor to this environment was 
the level of remuneration granted to board directors and senior management. We identified 
a high pay trend in the private companies reviewed well in excess of other high pay 
occupations.  This high pay culture also appears to have affected companies at the centre of 
the recent banking crisis by promoting a culture of short-termism. Paying board directors 
high levels of pay should be examined as it may compromise their decision-making.
 The evidence shows:
•	 In	2007,	board	chairpersons	of	private	companies	were	paid	an	average	of	€267,600	per	
position,	while	non-executive	directors	of	these	companies	were	paid	an	average	of	€66,769;
•	 Remuneration	for	CEOs	of	the	boards	of	Ireland’s	top	private	companies	and	State-owned	
bodies	increased	by	46	and	42	per	cent	respectively	between	2005	and	2007,	while	non-
executive	directors’	pay	in	private	companies	increased	by	23	per	cent;
•	 This	was	far	in	excess	of	inflation	(9.1	per	cent	for	both	years	combined)	and	led	to	pay	in	
absolute	terms	that	was	out	of	proportion	to	the	rest	of	the	economy;
•	 The	average	level	of	pay	for	CEOs	in	private	companies	was	€1.6	million	in	2007,	which	
equated	to	14	times	the	threshold	for	‘high	pay’	in	the	economy	in	2007.		This	also	equated	to	
136	times	the	poverty	income	threshold	beneath	which	one	in	six	households	lived.
1. Overview
31.6 Remuneration was particularly excessive in the financial sector, where it was perversely 
matched with some of the worst failures of corporate governance. The boards of a number 
of the publicly-listed financial sector companies, including companies such as Anglo Irish 
Bank, failed to prevent the excessive risk-taking which is at the root of Ireland’s current 
economic crisis. Some of these companies have systemic importance in Ireland’s economy 
so their failings have damaging outcomes beyond the individual companies and for the 
economy and society as a whole.
 The evidence shows:
•	 Over	half	of	the	members	of	the	Director	Network	held	board	positions	in	at	least	one	of	
Ireland’s	four	largest	financial	institutions:	Anglo	Irish	Bank,	AIB,	Bank	of	Ireland	and	Irish	
Life	and	Permanent;
•	 The	three	most	tightly-interwoven	boards	among	the	top	40	companies	were	financial	
institutions:	Anglo	Irish	Bank,	Bank	of	Ireland	and	Irish	Life	and	Permanent.
1.7 Discussion of the private and public sectors is often conducted as if these are very distinct 
segments of our society and our economy. This study found that the reality is quite the 
opposite. In theory, there can be useful interaction between the two sectors and it is good 
practice to have people from a mixture of backgrounds on boards. However, State-owned 
bodies have at their core the protection and advancement of the common good. The 
governance of public sector organisations must be safeguarded from any possible conflict 
of interest that might arise in the event that directors on their boards have private interests 
which could compromise the interests of the State-owned company.
 The evidence shows:
•	 Multiple	directorships	connect	seven	of	the	14	State-owned	bodies	to	12	of	the	26	private	
companies;
•	 One	in	four	members	of	the	Director	Network	sat	on	the	boards	of	both	State-owned	and	private	
companies	at	the	same	time;
•	 Half	or	more	of	the	Director	Network	have	at	some	time	engaged	in	public	service	either	through	
board	membership,	political	office	or	employment	as	a	public	servant.
1.8 The principle of supplying high-quality information to facilitate well-functioning markets 
is widely accepted although, as evidenced by the 2010 Grant Thornton report, the reality 
falls very far short even amongst the publicly-listed companies included in our study. 
Furthermore, private companies not listed on the stock exchange are not bound by the 
same corporate governance rules. The promotion of well-functioning markets should not 
be the only criterion, and there needs to be a similar appreciation shown of the importance 
of this same information being made available in the public interest. In particular, State-
owned bodies should operate transparently, so that the public can verify that these bodies 
are being managed in the public interest. However, this study found that in general State-
owned bodies operated to a lower standard of reporting and provided less detail than listed 
companies, rather than conforming to the higher standard.
 The evidence shows:
•	 The	annual	reports	of	most	State-owned	bodies	provided	less	transparency	of	information	
compared	to	the	annual	reports	of	those	private	companies	listed	on	the	Irish	Stock	Exchange.
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4 1.9 Publicly-listed companies in Ireland, as well as a number of other private companies, have 
an importance to the economy which makes their good governance of broad public interest. 
Some of them are referred to as ‘public interest companies’ in acknowledgement of this 
importance. The failures that prompted the recent focus on governance and regulatory 
failure have had a profound impact on the lives of ordinary people. Prioritising the public 
interest will require a fundamental reform of the Irish corporate governance system.
We argue:
•	 The	public	interest	must	be	safeguarded	as	part	of	the	corporate	governance	of	private	and	
publicly-listed	companies	of	major	importance	to	the	economy.
Jack Welch, former chief executive of 
General Electric and for a long time the 
business world’s most admired manager, 
declared in 1981 that “the ultimate test 
of corporate strategy, the only reliable 
measure, is whether it creates economic 
value for shareholders.”
He recanted in 2009. “On the face of it, 
shareholder value is the dumbest idea in 
the world,” he said. “Shareholder value 
is a result, not a strategy… your main 
constituencies are your employees, your 
customers and your products.”
(Financial Times, March 2009)
1.10 Ireland must design a new system of corporate 
governance, based on best practice and defence 
of the public interest. At present, the Irish Stock 
Exchange requires listed companies to follow the 
UK Combined Code of Corporate Governance. This 
code, outlined by the Financial Reporting Council 
(FRC) in the UK, operates on a ‘comply or explain’ 
basis rather than requiring mandatory adherence. 
There is a growing political consensus in Ireland 
in favour of putting some elements of corporate 
governance on a legislative footing. These proposals 
include board composition and independence; 
segregation of CEO and chairperson; clear definition 
of executive and non-executive responsibilities; 
selection of non-executive directors; and sanctions 
for non-compliance. The recent failures of regulation 
and corporate governance demonstrate that the UK 
Combined Code is neither sufficiently robust in its 
requirements nor supported by adequate sanctions 
for non-compliance. The UK Combined Code is just 
one of a number of systems in use internationally. 
While arguably no one set of rules is superior in its entirety, adoption of the best features 
from each could strengthen corporate governance in Ireland.
We argue:
•	 The	core	features	of	Ireland’s	system	of	corporate	governance	should	rest	on	a	new	statutory	basis;
•	 Based	on	the	evidence	from	our	research,	a	legal	base	for	corporate	governance	is	required	to	
ensure:	directors’	independence,	directors’	capacity	to	fulfil	their	duties	effectively,	diversity	of	
boards	and	limits	on	the	remuneration	of	board	members;
•	 These	could	include	the	following	elements:
 - Substantially	restricting	the	number	of	directorships	an	individual	can	hold,	particularly	
when	they	hold	significant	executive	responsibilities;
 - Reducing	or	eliminating	the	holding	of	cross-directorships;
 - Introducing	a	quota	system,	such	as	exists	in	Norway,	to	ensure	that	at	least	40	per	cent	of	
board	members	are	women;
 - Mechanisms	for	ensuring	that	interests	of	employees,	consumers	and	the	wider	public	are	
represented;
 - Rules	governing	decisions	on	remuneration	and/or	loans	to	directors	or	employees.
1. Overview
51.11 Current Government reform proposals also include applying elements of the UK 
Combined Code to State-sponsored bodies. While this would be an improvement on 
current standards in relation to transparency, State-owned bodies should be subject to 
stricter corporate governance because of their primary concern with the public interest.
We argue:
•	 An	independent	system	of	appointments	to	all	State-owned	bodies	should	be	introduced	(see	
TASC’s	forthcoming	detailed	proposals);
•	 Clear,	complete	information	on	the	operation	of	all	State-owned	bodies	should	be	publicly	
available.
1.12 The problems that our research have identified signal that we cannot afford to go back to 
‘business as usual’, by making merely cosmetic changes to the codes that govern corporate 
governance. Irish society is struggling to deal with the consequences of poor corporate 
governance, evident in the bailout of financial institutions (many of which feature in this 
report). These bailouts will place a substantial burden on society for years to come. Ireland 
must now make a fundamental shift towards enforcing legal compliance with corporate 
governance rules designed to protect the public interest. Constructing a new regime of 
corporate governance in Ireland must rest on a fundamental shift from the failed notion 
of ‘shareholder value’ to real stakeholder involvement. Ireland’s corporate governance 
system must be governed by stricter and more transparent rules to safeguard the interests 
of citizens affected by the behaviour of these companies.
Mapping the Golden Circle —TASC 2010
6 2. Mapping the golden Circle
2.1 This research is designed to test the assumption that Ireland’s top companies are run by 
a small pool of well-connected individuals sitting on their boards, and to investigate the 
extent to which the presence of such a pool could undermine the corporate governance 
of some of the Irish economy’s major players. It should be noted that this study presents 
only one method of identifying and analysing the presence of a well-connected group of 
individuals on the boards of some of Ireland’s top private companies and State-owned 
bodies. Due to the lack of information available on other sectors of the economy, this 
research provides a snapshot of a wider ‘golden circle’ that is yet to be fully mapped. 
Nevertheless, it provides an important development in the quantitative and systemic 
analysis of the evidence underlying the long-standing perceptions about this area of Irish 
business practice. 
2.2 The boards of 40 companies over the period 2005 to 2007 are examined. Details of each of 
these bodies are set out in Table 1. In summary, 26 are among the top private companies, 
and all but two are quoted on the Irish Stock Exchange; 14 are in State ownership. For 
purposes of this briefing, the terms ‘private companies’ and ‘State-owned bodies’ will be 
used respectively. More information on the methodology for the study, including the 
rationale for company selection, can be found in Appendix 1. 
2.3 Over three-quarters of the companies under review (33 out of 40) had ‘Interlocking 
Boards’; that is, these companies had directors who were members of two or more boards 
simultaneously during the period 2005-2007, representing seven per cent of those who 
served as directors on the 40 boards in the period 2005 to 2007. A total of 39 directors were 
simultaneously members of two or more of the boards under examination. As a short-
hand, this group will be termed the ‘Director Network’.
2.4 It should be noted that this research examines the evidence of multiple directorships and 
the potential problems that may result for good corporate governance. While individual 
directors are named in this report, there is no suggestion that they were in any way in 
breach of their statutory or moral obligations in their capacity as directors of multiple 
companies.
2.5 Through the existence of the Director Network, companies are linked together. Each 
director acts as a bridge between two or more of the major companies under examination, 
and the combined linkages through several directors meant that some companies had a 
large number of links via shared directors to other companies within the top companies. 
For example, Anglo Irish Bank was linked to ten other companies through having directors 
from its board simultaneously sitting on other boards. Figure 1 (overleaf) illustrates the 
linkages between the companies through the Director Network and Table 2 gives the 
number of links per company.
7Report Summary
Table 1 – information on the 40 companies in this study
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Aer Lingus ✓ PLC 1936 3,600 €1,285 37
AIB ✓ PLC 1966 24,000 €4,868 3
Anglo Irish Bank ✓ PLC 1964 1,700 €1,761 5
Bank of Ireland ✓ PLC 1783 16,000 €4,120 2
C&C ✓ PLC 1937 1,800 €739 76
CRH ✓ PLC 1970 92,000 €21,000 1
DCC ✓ PLC 1976 8,000 €4,046 9
Dragon Oil ✗ PLC 1971 750 €597 115
Eircom ✓ PLC 1999 7,725 €1,192 27
Elan ✓ PLC 1969 600 $516.4 95
Fyffes ✓ PLC 1880 4,500 €550 91
Glanbia ✓ PLC 1997 5,100 €2,207 22
Grafton Group ✓ PLC 1902 10,000 €3,205 13
Greencore ✓ PLC 1991 8,430 €1,267 39
IAWS (Aryzta) ✓ PLC 1988 3,100 €1,907 28
ICG ✓ PLC 1972 600 €356 138
Independent News and Media ✓ PLC 1904 11,000 €1,674 30
Irish Life and Permanent ✓ PLC 1999 1,600 €1,152 6
Kerry Group ✓ PLC 1972 23,000 €4,788 8
Kingspan ✓ PLC 1970 3,200 €1,863 29
McInerney ✓ PLC 1909 1,000 €633 79
Paddy Power ✓ PLC 1988 1,468 €279 177
Ryanair ✓ PLC 1985 5,000 €2,714 21
Smurfit ✓ PLC 1934 40,000 €7,272 4
Tullow Oil ✗ PLC 1985 45 €639 59
United Drug ✓ PLC 1948 525 €1,584 32
An Post ✗ State 1984 9,900 €884 57
Bord Gais ✗ State 1976 900 €1,215
Bord Na Mona ✓ State 1946 1,750 €290 168
Central Bank ✓ State 1943 NA €1,519
CIE ✗ State 1945 12,250 €785 66
DDDA ✓ State 1997 46 €37.6
Dublin Airport Authority ✓ State 1937 3,163 €623.3 83
Eirgrid ✓ State 2001 225 €290.4
Enterprise Ireland ✓ State 1998 NA €280
ESB ✗ State 1927 6,692 €1,501 15
FÁS ✗ State 1988 NA €1,071
Forfás ✓ State 1994 NA €79
IDA ✓ State 1949 NA €183
Irish Aviation Authority ✓ State 1994 700 €154.2
Source: annual reports, irish Times listings (6 June 2008), our analysis (re interlocking boards).
Na = information was not available.
Mapping the Golden Circle —TASC 2010
8 2.6 In order to illustrate the connections between Interlocking Boards and between 
individuals with multiple directorships within those boards, a network analysis was 
undertaken. This involved creating diagrams with either companies or individuals as 
points, and lines showing links between them. For example, in Figure 1, Anglo-Irish 
Bank and Bord na Mona are presented as points in the top right-hand corner. The line 
connecting these two companies illustrates the fact that one individual sat on both boards 
simultaneously at some point during the period 2005 to 2007. Similarly, in Figure 2, each 
point illustrates a named director and each link between two directors indicate that the 
individuals were both board members of at least one of the companies at the same time, 
during all or part of the period 2005 to 2007.
Figure 1 – The interlocking boards
Anglo Irish Bank
McInerney Holdings
Greencore
Dublin Airport Authority
Aer Lingus
DDDA
Smurfit
United Drug
Paddy Power
Bord na Mona
Forfás
IAWS
Irish Life 
and Permanent C&C
Enterprise Ireland
IAA
Glanbia
Fyffes
ElanKingspan
Grafton Group CRH
Central BankKerry Group
Independent News & Media Eirgrid
IDA
Eircom
AIB
ICG
DCC
Ryanair
Bank of Ireland
2. Mapping the Golden Circle
9Table 2 – The number of links from each company to other companies in this study
COMPANIES NUMBER OF LINKS
Anglo Irish Bank 10
Bank of Ireland; Irish Life and Permanent 9
Elan; United Drug 8
Aer Lingus; AIB; CRH; Smurfit 7
DDDA; Greencore 6
Enterprise Ireland; Forfás 5
C&C; Dublin Airport Authority; IAWS; IDA; Independent News & Media 4
DCC; Eircom; Fyffes; Glanbia; ICG; McInerney Holdings 3
Bord Na Mona; Kerry Group; Ryanair 2
Central Bank; Eirgrid; Grafton Group; IAA; Kingspan; Paddy Power 1
2.7 Only seven companies did not have interlocking directorships. It is worth noting that of 
the seven, five belonged to the public sector and only two, Tullow Oil and Dragon Oil, 
belonged to the private sector. 
2.8 The top 40 companies in our study were, on average, directly linked via joint directorships 
to three or four (3.6) other major companies. Furthermore, the extent to which companies 
were linked to other companies varied. As few as six companies had just a single link to 
one other company, while at the other extreme Anglo Irish Bank had links to ten other 
companies. 
2.9 Table 3 lists the members of the Director Network and shows the number of boards they 
sat on simultaneously as well as whether they held executive positions over the three-year 
period 2005-2007. Over half (22) of the Director Network sat on more than one board for 
each of the three years under review, thus underlining that holding multiple directorships 
are common and normal practice amongst a small number of people. 
2.10 It is important to note that in all cases, in addition to being on multiple boards of the 
top companies, members of this Director Network were, on average, also members of 
the boards of ten other companies each, outside the 40 companies being examined here. 
Further detail of each individual is given in the SoloCheck data in Appendix 2. The average 
is skewed by individuals with a high number of directorships; individual cases varied 
greatly, ranging from four individuals with no other directorships than those identified 
here, to one individual who simultaneously held 57 additional directorships. Between 
them, the 39 held a total of 398 directorships, in addition to the 93 directorships they held 
within the major companies being examined here. 
2.11 It should be noted that some of these directorships were for subsidiaries, rather 
than involving the full workload of directing a separate company. The Companies 
(Amendment) (No. 2) Act 1999 limits the number of companies of which any one 
individual can be a director to twenty-five, but certain categories of companies are 
excluded in arriving at the total of twenty-five; the most important exclusion being where 
a person is a director of a holding company and is also a director of its subsidiaries, the 
‘group’ shall count as only one directorship for the purposes of calculating the total.
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10 Table 3– The director network
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Bowler, Gillian 2 05, 06, 07 - 05, 06, 07 2 2 2 11
Bradshaw, Lar 2 05, 06 - 05, 06, 07 2 2 1 11
Buckley, Denis 2 05, 06, 07 - 05, 06, 07 2 2 2 5
Byrne, David 2 - - 05, 06, 07 2 2 2 3
Crowley, Laurence 2 05 - 05, 06, 07 2 1 1 18
Dilger, David 2 - 05, 06, 07 05, 06, 07 2 2 2 44
Dorgan, Sean 2 - 05, 06, 07 05, 06, 07 2 2 2 0
Drury, Fintan 2 05, 06, 07 - 05, 06, 07 2 2 2 10
Dunne, John 2 05, 06, 07 - 05, 06, 07 2 2 2 0
FitzGerald, Liam 2 - 05, 06, 07 05, 06, 07 2 2 2 10
FitzPatrick, Sean 5 05, 06, 07 - 05, 06, 07 4 4 4 28
Gray, Danuta 2 - - 05, 06, 07 1 2 2 17
Haran, Paul 2 - - 05, 06, 07 2 2 2 3
Heraty, Ann 3 - - 05, 06, 07 2 3 3 5
Hodgkinson, Michael 2 - - 05, 06, 07 2 2 1 0
Kennedy, Gary 3 - 05 05, 06, 07 3 1 1 4
Liston Jerry 2 06, 07 - 05, 06, 07 1 2 2 2
Lynch, Philip 3 - - 05, 06, 07 3 2 2 31
MacSharry, Ray 2 - - 05, 06 2 1 0 NA
McCann, Gary 4 05, 06, 07 05, 06, 07 05, 06, 07 4 4 4 4
McCourt, Declan 3 - - 05, 06, 07 3 3 2 26
McGowan, Kieran 5 - - 05, 06, 07 5 5 5 20
McGuckian, John 2 05, 06, 07 - 05, 06 2 2 1 3
McLaughlin, Kyran 2 05, 06, 07 - 05, 06, 07 2 2 2 7
Molloy, Pat 2 05, 06, 07 - - 2 2 1 2
Moran, Thomas 2 - - 06, 07 1 2 1 1
Murphy, William 2 - - 05, 06, 07 2 2 2 12
Neill, Terry 2 - - 05, 06, 07 2 2 2 NA
O’Connor, Dan 2 - - 06, 07 0 1 2 1
O’Mahony, Liam 2 - 05, 06, 07 07 1 1 2 NA
O’Reilly, Anthony 2 05, 06 05, 06, 07 - 2 2 1 10
Pratt, Maurice 2 - 05, 06, 07 05, 06 2 2 1 57
Roche, Donal 2 - - 05, 06, 07 2 2 1 17
Ryan, Frank 2 - 05, 06, 07 05, 06, 07 2 2 2 NA
Somers, Bernard 4 - - 05, 06, 07 3 4 4 31
Sullivan, Michael J 2 - - 05, 06, 07 2 2 2 NA
Sullivan, Ned 3 05, 06, 07 - 05, 06, 07 3 3 3 NA
Walsh, Willie 2 - 05 05, 06 2 1 0 NA
Williams, Jane 2 - - 05, 06, 07 1 2 2 5
Total 93 83 84 75 398
* Figures drawn from Solocheck.ie and include subsidiaries (see method section)
Na = information not available
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112.12 Sitting on multiple boards widens the working contacts and links of directors. The extent 
of these linkages across the network provides support to the hypothesis that the boards of 
top Irish businesses are indeed run by a small pool of well-connected individuals. Figure 2 
illustrates the linkages between the directors in the network. Table 4 gives the number of 
links per director. For example, Sean FitzPatrick sat on five of the 33 Interlocking Boards, 
and as a result was directly in contact with 11 other members of the Director Network. 
Figure 2 – The director network
Sean FitzPatrick
Danuta Gray
Declan McCourt
David Dilger
Thomas Moran
Willie Walsh
Liam O’MahonyGary McCann
Lar Bradshaw Ned Sullivan
Fintan Drury
Anne Heraty
Frank Ryan
Jane Williams
Sean Dorgan
John Dunne
Donal Roche
Anthony O’Reilly
Maurice Pratt
Bernard Somers
Gary Kennedy John McGuckian
Dan O’Connor
Liam FitzGerald
Michael J. Sullivan
Denis Buckley
Philip Lynch
Pat Molloy
William Murphy
Kieran McGowan
Paul Haran
Jerry Liston
Kyran McLaughlin
Laurence Crowley
Ray MacSharry
Michael Hodgkinson
Terry Neill
David Byrne
Gillian Bowler
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12 Table 4 – links to other members of the director network
DIRECTOR NUMBER OF LINKS
Kieran McGowan 14
Sean FitzPatrick, Terry Neill 11
Laurence Crowley, Declan McCourt 10
David Dilger, Paul Haran, Anne Heraty, Gary McCann, Thomas Moran 9
Michael Hodgkinson, Philip Lynch, Ray MacSharry 8
Gary Kennedy, Ned Sullivan 7
Lar Bradshaw, Sean Dorgan, Danuta Gray, Dan O’Connor, Liam O’Mahony, Frank Ryan, 6
Fintan Drury, Pat Molloy, Michael J Sullivan 5
Gillian Bowler, David Byrne, Liam FitzGerald, Kyran McLaughlin, William Murphy, Maurice Pratt, 
Bernard Somers, Jane Williams, 4
Denis Buckley, John Dunne, John McGuckian, Anthony O’Reilly, Donal Roche 3
Jerry Liston, Willie Walsh 2
2.13 Two methods were used to test the hypothesis that Ireland’s top companies have a 
small pool of well-connected individuals sitting on their boards. Firstly, the extent of 
direct contact between members of the Directors Network was examined by counting 
the number of other members of the Network that each individual met in the course of 
attending board meetings for the companies in this study. Individuals were considered 
particularly well-connected if they were linked to ten or more other members of the 
Director Network. Secondly, individuals were considered particularly well-connected 
if they sat on three or more boards out of the top 40 companies being examined. The 
individuals who were included through one or both methods were identified as the eleven 
most well-connected directors. 
2.14 The extent to which members of the Director Network are in direct contact with one 
another is one way of testing the hypothesis that Ireland’s top companies have a small 
pool of well-connected individuals sitting on their boards. Table 4 lists the directors in 
order of how many links they have to other members of the Network. Figure 3 highlights 
the five members of the Director Network with the greatest number of links (ten or more). 
The lines show which individuals were directly linked to one another.
2. Mapping the Golden Circle
13Figure 3 – The director network (with five directors with 10+ links highlighted)
Sean FitzPatrick
Declan McCourt
Liam O’Mahony
Gary McCann
Ned Sullivan
Anne Heraty
Kieran McGowan
Philip Lynch
Bernard Somers
Gary Kennedy
Frank Ryan
Jane Williams
Sean Dorgan
John Dunne
Donal Roche
Anthony O’Reilly
Maurice Pratt
John McGuckian
Dan O’Connor
Liam FitzGerald
Michael J. Sullivan
Denis Buckley
Pat Molloy
William Murphy
Paul Haran
Jerry Liston
Kyran McLaughlin
Laurence Crowley
Ray MacSharry
Michael Hodgkinson
Terry Neill
David Byrne
Gillian Bowler
Fintan Drury
Lar Bradshaw
David Dilger
Thomas Moran
Danuta Gray
Willie Walsh
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14 2.15 Another way of testing the hypothesis of a small pool of well-connected individuals on 
multiple key boards is to examine how many directors sat on more than two boards. 
In most cases, the Director Network comprises people who sat on two boards, but nine 
individuals sat on three, four or even five boards of these major companies simultaneously 
(as shown on Table 5). Each of these nine directors also simultaneously held an average of 
17 other directorships, in addition to their directorships in the top companies, although 
this varied greatly, from two directors with four other directorships each to two who held 
31 additional directorships each. Overall, this group of nine directors held over a third 
(149) of the additional directorships held by the Director Network (see Table 6). Figure 4 
highlights the nine directors who sat on three or more boards. 
Table 5 – Members of the director network on 3+ boards
DIRECTOR NUMBER OF BOARDS
FitzPatrick, Sean 5
McGowan, Kieran 5
McCann, Gary 4
Somers, Bernard 4
Heraty, Anne 3
Lynch, Philip 3
Kennedy, Gary 3
McCourt, Declan 3
Sullivan, Ned 3
2. Mapping the Golden Circle
15Figure 4 – The director network (with nine directors on 3+ boards highlighted)
Sean FitzPatrick
Declan McCourt
Liam O’Mahony
Gary McCann
Ned Sullivan
Anne Heraty
Kieran McGowan
Philip Lynch
Bernard Somers
Gary Kennedy
Frank Ryan
Jane Williams
Sean Dorgan
John Dunne
Donal Roche
Anthony O’Reilly
Maurice Pratt
John McGuckian
Dan O’Connor
Liam FitzGerald
Michael J. Sullivan
Denis Buckley
Pat Molloy
William Murphy
Paul Haran
Jerry Liston
Kyran McLaughlin
Laurence Crowley
Ray MacSharry
Michael Hodgkinson
Terry Neill
David Byrne
Gillian Bowler
Fintan Drury
Lar Bradshaw
David Dilger
Thomas Moran
Danuta Gray
Willie Walsh
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16 2.16 There is substantial overlap between the list of five most linked directors and the nine 
sitting on three or more boards. In total, eleven directors were the most ‘well-connected’ of 
the 39 in the Director Network. These eleven directors are highlighted in Figure 5. Table 6 
gives more detail of these ‘well-connected’ directors.
2.17 Figure 5 also illustrates the extent to which the eleven most well-connected directors 
were connected to one another. Again, this reinforces the perception of a small group at 
the apex of Irish business. For example, Sean FitzPatrick sat on five boards with four of 
the other eleven directors: Anne Heraty (Anglo Irish Bank), Gary McCann (Anglo Irish 
Bank and Smurfit), Declan McCourt (DDDA) and Ned Sullivan (Anglo Irish Bank and 
Greencore). 
2.18 One striking aspect is that all eleven were directors of one of the banks or building 
societies. For example, Sean FitzPatrick, Gary McCann, and Ned Sullivan were all directors 
of Anglo Irish Bank during the three years 2005 to 2007, while Anne Heraty was a director 
of Anglo Irish for two years, from 2006 to 2007. This issue is explored in more detail in 
Chapter 4.  
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17Figure 5 – The director network (with 11 most well-connected directors highlighted
Sean FitzPatrick
Declan McCourt
Liam O’Mahony
Gary McCann
Ned Sullivan
Anne Heraty
Kieran McGowan
Philip Lynch
Bernard Somers
Gary Kennedy
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Jane Williams
Sean Dorgan
John Dunne
Donal Roche
Anthony O’Reilly
Maurice Pratt
John McGuckian
Dan O’Connor
Liam FitzGerald
Michael J. Sullivan
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Paul Haran
Jerry Liston
Kyran McLaughlin
Laurence Crowley
Ray MacSharry
Michael Hodgkinson
Terry Neill
David Byrne
Gillian Bowler
Fintan Drury
Lar Bradshaw
David Dilger
Thomas Moran
Danuta Gray
Willie Walsh
Mapping the Golden Circle —TASC 2010
18 Table 6 – information on the 11 most well-connected members of the director network
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Crowley, 
Laurence
Elan ✓ €58,007 (2005) NED 18 Chairperson of Ecocem Ltd. and Realex Payments
Bank of Ireland  ✓ (2005) €419,000 (2005)
Chair 
(2005) -  
FitzPatrick, 
Sean
Aer Lingus ✗ €45,000 NED 28 Retired as CEO of Anglo Irish Bank in 2005
Anglo Irish Bank ✓ €431,000 Chair -  
DDDA ✗ €13,500** (2006) NED -  
Greencore ✓ €48,000 NED -  
Smurfit ✓ €250,000 Chair -  
Heraty, 
Anne
Anglo Irish Bank ✓ €83,000 NED 5 CEO CPL Resources
Bord Na Mona ✗ €16,500** NED -  
Forfás ✗ €32,583** NED -  
Kennedy, 
Gary
AIB ✗ €2,934,000 (2005)
Exec. 
Dir. 4 NED Greencore (Appointed 2008)
Elan ✗ €30,909 (2005) NED -  
IDA ✗ €29,666** (2005) NED -  
Lynch, 
Philip
C&C ✓ €59,000 (2005) NED 31 CEO One 51 Capital Plc
IAWS ✗ €300,000 (2005) NED - NED FBD Plc
Irish Life and Permanent ✗ €24,000 (2005) NED -  
McCann, 
Gary
Anglo Irish Bank ✓ €85,000 NED 4 CEO Smurfit
Dublin Airport Authority ✓ €27,333** Chair -  
Smurfit ✗ €2,593,000 CEO -  
United Drug ✓ €55,000 NED -  
McCourt, 
Declan
Bank of Ireland ✓ €80,000 (2006) NED 26 CEO OHM Group
DDDA ✗ €13,500** (2006) NED - NED Blackrock International Land Plc
Fyffes ✓ €54,000 (2006) NED -  
McGowan, 
Kieran
CRH ✓ €315,000 NED 20 Chairperson of Business in the community Ireland
Elan ✗ €60,718 NED - Director of Drury Communications
Enterprise Ireland ✗ €8,573 NED - Former CEO IDA Ireland
Irish Life and Permanent ✓ €83,000 NED -  
United Drug ✓ €60,000 NED -  
Neill, Terry
CRH ✓ €85,000 NED NA Chairperson of Finance Committee London Business School
Bank of Ireland ✓ €100,000 NED -  
Somers, 
Bernard
AIB ✓ €50,000 NED 31 Partner at Somers & Associates Chartered Accountants
DCC ✗ €75,000 NED -  
ICG ✗ €135,000 NED -  
Independent News & Media ✗ €50,000 NED -  
Sullivan, 
Ned
Anglo Irish Bank ✓ €108,000 NED NA Chairperson Eircom (Appointed 2008)
Greencore ✓ €200,000 Chair -  
McInerney Holdings ✓ €120,000 Chair -  
2. Mapping the Golden Circle
19remuneration includes salary, fees, pension contributions, taxable benefits, profit shares and bonuses 
reported in the annual reports for 2007, or nearest year where the individual held the most multiple 
directorships.
* Drawn from Solocheck.ie (See method section).
** individual breakdown not available for State bodies. remuneration stated is the average fees paid to 
board members, based on the total board members fees information provided.
*** information on main employment is drawn from diverse publicly-available information. in some cases, 
it is difficult to identify the ‘primary’ occupation of some of the directors.
Na information not available.
NeD non-executive director.
elan remuneration has been converted from u.S. Dollars into euro using the 21 day average exchange rate for 
December of the year in question.
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20 3. potential risks to good Corporate governance 
Potential 
Risks to 
Corporate
Governance
Questions
over
independence
Excessive 
Remuneration
Lack of time
Lack of 
diversity
3.1 The evidence presented in the previous chapter suggests that a small number of directors 
in Ireland’s top private companies and State-owned bodies did belong to a small pool of 
well-connected individuals. While they only represent seven per cent of the total number 
of directors who sat on the boards of these companies during the period 2005-2007, 
members of the Director Network sat on nearly all (92 per cent) the private companies’ 
boards examined and two-thirds (64 per cent) of the boards of State-owned bodies.
3.2 It is hence important to examine the evidence that the existence of Interlocking Boards 
and a Director Network poses a wider problem for corporate governance across Ireland’s 
top companies. Overall, although only 39 out of these companies’ 572 directors belonged 
to the Director Network, the extent to which 33 Interlocking Boards were interwoven 
suggests that a number of risks to good corporate governance were present.
MulTiple COMMiTMenTs 
3.3 The capacity to undertake multiple directorship roles depends on the complexity and 
diversity of each company, together with the degree of change being undergone by such 
companies, as well as the other commitments of the director in question. Nonetheless, 
we can speculate that because of the extent of multiple commitments of the 39 directors 
presented in the previous chapter, some of them may have been over-extended and thus 
unable to fulfil all of their roles as directors effectively, which is in itself a serious issue for 
good corporate governance.
3.4 We do not have to rely on commonsense for this conclusion. The OECD publishes 
principles on corporate governance, which among other things suggest that “service 
3. Potential Risks to Good Corporate Governance 
21on too many boards can interfere with the performance of board members” (OECD, 
June 2009: 44). The Irish Stock Exchange uses the UK Combined Code to regulate listed 
private companies in Ireland. Companies listed in Ireland are required to ‘comply’ with 
the code, or else ‘explain’ why they did not as part of their annual reporting obligations. 
(See Chapter 6 for more details on corporate governance rules). Currently, the Combined 
Code is being reviewed in the UK. As part of the process, new principles have been 
proposed regarding the “need for all directors to have sufficient time to perform their 
responsibilities effectively” (FRC, March 2009).
3.5 Furthermore, the 2009 Walker Review in the UK recommends that non-executive directors 
on the boards of banks should be expected to give greater time commitment than has been 
normal in the past; there should be a minimum expected time commitment of 30 to 36 
days on a major bank board. In relation to the chairperson, a minimum of two-thirds of 
his/her time is recommended, with some arguing that it should be no less than a full-time 
position. There are also arguments that there should be specific limits on the number of 
non-executive directorships one individual can hold. These limits could be a function of 
the aggregate of the expected time commitments that regulation already requires and of 
the time commitments of other employment/directorships.
3.6 Focusing on the eleven most well-connected of the 39 members of the Director Network 
makes it easier to test the hypothesis that multiple directorships may lead to individuals 
being too over-extended to perform their duties as directors. Table 6 shows that each 
of the eleven had extensive business commitments. Four were chairs of at least one 
of the Interlocking Boards. Sean FitzPatrick was chair of two (Anglo Irish Bank for the 
full 2005-2007 period and Smurfit in 2007) as was Ned Sullivan (who chaired Smurfit 
and McInerney Holdings). Gary McCann was CEO of Smurfit and chairperson of the 
Dublin Airport Authority for the full three years. Moreover, in addition to their roles 
on the Interlocking Boards, these eleven people had and still have extensive further 
commitments. For example, Philip Lynch, in addition to his three non-executive 
directorships, held 31 additional private company directorships, including his role 
as CEO of 151PLC. Declan McCourt, in addition to his non-executive directorships of 
Bank of Ireland, Fyffes and the DDDA, was CEO of the OHM group and a director of 25 
other companies. Bernard Somers was principal of an accountancy practice and held 
31 additional private directorships while he was a non-executive director of four of the 
Interlocking Boards: AIB, DCC, ICG and Independent News and Media. It should be noted 
in each case that some of the additional private directorships may have been on the boards 
of subsidiary companies (see paras 2.4 and 2.11).
3.7 Looking at the remaining 28 members of the Director Network, Table 3 shows that six 
of them were CEOs while also sitting on another board, nine were chairpersons and 
one was both a CEO of one company and a company chairperson of another. The level 
of directorship activity observed is all the more noteworthy in view of the significant 
proportion of Director Network members who held very senior full-time positions either 
as CEOs or executive directors or equivalent positions in their own organisations. Again, 
this was often in addition to extensive other commitments.
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3.8 In eight private companies and one State-owned body, a third or more of non-executive 
board members belonged to the Director Network in 2007. Over two-thirds of the non-
executive directors of Anglo Irish Bank (67 per cent) and ICG (67 per cent), and half of 
those in Irish Life and Permanent (50 per cent), were members of the Director Network. 
This is shown in Table 7. 
3.9 The primary function of the non-executive director is to provide independent oversight 
of the activities of the company, in the interests of the company and its stakeholders. 
His/her independence can potentially be compromised by multiple mutual obligations, 
by-products of multiple directorships. Over 80 per cent of the companies/organisations 
reviewed were found to be directly linked through a relatively small number of 
individuals. The presence of one well-connected individual on a company’s board of 
directors does not necessarily mean that the corporate governance of that organisation is 
weakened. However, it can be argued that a single individual, if this person has sufficient 
power and influence, can have a very substantial impact on the decisions and actions of a 
board. Referring to the Anglo Irish Bank case and the role played by Sean FitzPatrick, the 
journalist, Kathleen Barrington commented that “Four years after he was appointed …, the 
effects of an overpowering chairman were plain to be seen….The damage done to Ireland’s 
reputation by those events was so great that Minister for Finance Brian Lenihan felt the 
need to mount an international charm offensive” (Sunday Business Post, 22 Nov, 2009). 
3.10 Furthermore, the presence of several well-connected individuals suggests a more serious 
problem. When a board has multiple links to other companies, there is a risk of a conflict 
of interest; board members may have divided loyalties between the different bodies on 
whose boards they sit.
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Anglo Irish Bank 14 5 - - 9 6 67%
ICG 6 3 - - 3 2 67%
Irish Life and Permanent 12 4 - - 8 4 50%
Bank of Ireland 17 7 - - 10 4 40%
McInerney Holdings 10 5 - - 5 2 40%
Eircom (2006) 13 4 - - 9 3 33%
Elan 16 4 - - 12 4 33%
Forfás 14 2 - - 12 4 33%
United Drug 10 4 1 25% 6 2 33%
Aer Lingus 12 2 - - 10 3 30%
C&C 11 4 1 25% 7 2 29%
Greencore 11 4 1 25% 7 2 29%
CRH 16 5 1 20% 11 3 27%
IAWS 15 4 - - 11 3 27%
Smurfit 12 3 1 33% 9 2 22%
Grafton Group 9 4 - - 5 1 20%
AIB 20 4 - - 16 3 19%
Enterprise Ireland 12 1 1 100% 11 2 18%
Dublin Airport Authority 13 1 - - 12 2 17%
Fyffes 10 4 - - 6 1 17%
Paddy Power 9 3 - - 6 1 17%
Glanbia 22 3 - - 19 3 16%
DCC 11 4 - - 7 1 14%
Eirgrid 9 2 - - 7 1 14%
Ryanair 8 1 - - 7 1 14%
IAA 9 1 - - 8 1 13%
Kingspan 15 7 - - 8 1 13%
Kerry Group 22 5 - - 17 2 12%
Central Bank 13 3 - - 10 1 10%
Bord Na Mona 12 1 - - 11 1 9%
IDA 14 2 1 50% 12 1 8%
Independent News & Media 20 5 1 20% 15 1 7%
DDDA 8 - - - 8 - -
Source: annual reports for 2007 (board numbers), our analysis (Director Network numbers)
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3.11 Currently, the Combined Code, the system of governance that applies to all publicly-listed 
companies in Ireland, is being reviewed in the UK.  As part of that process, one of the 
major issues being reviewed is the size and diversity of the available pool of non-executive 
directors.
3.12 There is widespread agreement in the UK that the current pool from which directors are 
drawn is too narrow. One strong view is that the narrowness of the pool results from a lack 
of demand for new candidates on the part of companies rather than a shortage of suitable 
candidates in the first instance (Merson, 2010:80). The UK Treasury Select Committee 
report (TSC, 15 May 2009) on the banking crisis identified in many cases a lack of diversity 
as a key problem affecting non-executive directors in the banking sector.
3.13 One of the strongest arguments for increasing diversity on boards is to introduce fresh 
perspectives and combat the kind of ‘groupthink’ exemplified in the run-up to the current 
crisis:  
“We	received	evidence	that	the	pool	from	which	non-executive	directors	in	the	banking	sector	were	
recruited	was	far	too	narrow	…	arguing	that	if	boards	consisted	of	people	who	read	the	same	
newspapers,	went	to	the	same	universities	and	schools	and	have	the	same	prejudices	and	views	to	sit	
round	a	board	table	you	do	not	get	diversity	of	view	and	input.”	(TSC,	15	May	2009:	55,	para	150).
3.14 In Ireland, our review of the 39 people in the Director Network is indicative of a similar 
tendency. It is reasonable to suggest that this lack of diversity could be stronger because 
of Ireland’s relatively small population. Directors typically are Dublin-based, mostly 
on the city’s south-side. All but six live either in Dublin or its neighbouring counties – 
Wicklow, Meath and Kildare. Popular addresses include Greystones, and various areas of 
South Dublin: Foxrock, Dún Laoghaire, Donnybrook, Rathgar, Monkstown and Blackrock. 
A third-level education is the norm and many have attended private schools such as 
Gonzaga, Blackrock and Belvedere. While information on educational background is 
variable, a number are trained as either accountants or solicitors/barristers and University 
College Dublin appears to be the third level institution of choice. With most aged over 50 
and very many in their sixties, the youngest member of the Director Network was aged 46.
3.15 The Director Network is made up largely of men who are relatively near to each other in 
age, live in close geographical proximity and are likely to have attended the same schools 
and university. Thus, the Interlocking Board linkages demonstrated by this review raise 
the question of whether, as in the UK, Irish companies need to actively seek candidates 
from a much wider circle to ensure that the boards of Ireland’s top companies are not 
dominated by a small number of people who are known to one another. Such a high 
level of interaction and connection between members of this circle could, at a minimum, 
render them over-extended.  It could also generate conflicts of interest as directors of 
multiple companies. In addition, the wider interests of stakeholders, including employees, 
customers and the public in general, are less likely to be served when boards of directors 
are dominated by people from a narrow social stratum.
3.16 The gender composition of the boards is of particular concern. Just four women, or ten per 
cent, are members of the Director Network. This is similar to the proportion of women (11 
per cent) in the 572 directors reviewed for this briefing. Thus, there is a serious under-
representation of women serving on the boards of the companies and State-owned bodies 
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cent women board directors. The position is better in the public sector, with just over 
18 per cent women directors among the bodies surveyed here. However, this proportion 
falls a long way short of the longstanding Government commitment to achieving a 
minimum of 40 per cent female membership of boards of public bodies. It is also a long 
way short of the norm. The CSO’s Women and Men in Ireland 2009 report showed that 
women accounted for 34 per cent of members of State boards; which is nearly double their 
representation on the 14 key economic State-owned bodies.
3.17 The small number of women on boards of listed companies is not unique to Ireland. In 
the UK, for example, research carried out by Co-operative Asset Management has revealed 
that women occupy only 242 out of 2,742 seats (nine per cent) on the boards of FTSE-350 
companies, with the five banks covered in the survey having one female executive director 
and six non-executive directors out of a total of 70 seats (The Observer, 23 August 2009). 
While a 2010 Treasury Select Committee on Women in the City did not recommend a 
statutory quota, it noted evidence that the presence of women strengthened boards’ ability 
to challenge executives.  The Committee Report also noted arguments in favour of gender 
equality and utilising all talent available.
3.18 All of this strongly suggests the need for regulation requiring more women among board 
directors. For example, Norway legally requires 40 per cent of directors on every board to 
be women; Spain has introduced a quota of 40 per cent to be implemented by 2015 and, in 
January 2010, France’s parliament voted for a 40 per cent quota to be implemented by 2016 
(The Economist, 11 March 2010). An editorial in the Financial Times has suggested that the 
current review of regulation in the UK offers an opportunity for a voluntary time-limited 
quota to achieve at least 30 per cent female directors of listed companies within ten years.
exCessive reMuneraTiOn 
3.19 Part of the incentive for business leaders is monetary reward, although this is only part of 
the picture. There is an ongoing debate regarding the extent to which monetary reward 
acts as an incentive, and whether there is a ceiling beyond which no additional motivation 
occurs. The debate about monetary reward is particularly salient when one considers 
the high level of remuneration that occurs within the boards of Ireland’s companies, 
especially in the private financial sector. 
3.20 In general, where the level of remuneration is high, independence can potentially be 
compromised by a desire to retain what is a lucrative position. The average remuneration 
of non-executive directors in the private companies in this study in 2007 was €66,769. This 
level of remuneration is a significant source of income even for relatively wealthy people.
3.21 Furthermore, for all board directors, but particularly for the chair and those in executive 
positions, they could feel that challenging the executives in one company might 
jeopardise not only a position in that company but also positions in other companies 
in which those executives have influence. This can create a mutually reinforcing set of 
behaviours in which boards and their remuneration committees fail to prevent either the 
risk-taking that leads to short-term gains, or the excessive remuneration and bonuses that 
result, thus failing to control the most readily identifiable conflict of interest which faces 
directors and managers.
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26 3.22 There is a real risk that board directors become isolated from the rest of the economy in 
terms of remuneration and become self-referential with respect to levels of pay. This was 
noted by Richard Posner, a prominent US scholar and federal judge. In a dissenting opinion 
he says “executive compensation in large publicly traded firms often is excessive because 
of the feeble incentives of boards of directors to police compensation … Directors are often 
CEOs of other companies and naturally think that CEOs should be well paid. And often 
they are picked by the CEO.” (Jones v. Harris, 527 F.3d 627).
3.23 The review of pay rates for executive and non-executive board members in Ireland’s 
leading private companies and State-owned organisations shows that they are extremely 
well-rewarded when compared with pay rates in the economy, particularly when the part-
time nature of the work is taken into account. Table 8 gives the average pay enjoyed by 
all types of director in private companies and by CEOs in State-owned companies. (There 
was insufficient data available on other directors’ pay in State-owned companies, as this 
is often presented as an aggregate in their annual reports, rather than individually as is 
the case for private companies). The remuneration figures include salary, fees, pension 
contributions, taxable benefits, profit shares and bonuses, as reported in the companies’ 
annual reports. The full detail of remuneration for each private company and State-owned 
body is given in Appendix 3.
Table 8 – average remuneration of board members (2005-2007)
CEO
(PRIVATE 
COMPANIES)
CEO 
(STATE-OWNED)
ExECUTIVE 
DIRECTOR 
(PRIVATE COS.)
CHAIRPERSON
(PRIVATE COS.)
NON-ExECUTIVE 
DIRECTOR
(PRIVATE COS.)
2005 €1,110,611 €318,291 €688,795 €215,491 €54,356
Base year Base year Base year Base year Base year
2006 €1,425,226 €412,756 €683,715 €243,114 €58,188
Change 2005-06 28% 30% -1% 13% 7%
2007 €1,620,049 €451,724 €879,934 €267,600 €66,769
Change 2006-07 14% 9% 29% 10% 15%
Change over two 
years (2005-2007) 46% 42% 28% 24% 23%
n 21 7 21 20 22
remuneration includes salary, fees, pension contributions, taxable benefits, profit shares and bonuses 
reported in the annual reports for 2007 for those companies for which information was available (n).
3.24 The average pay of CEOs in private companies rose by 46 per cent over the two-year 
period, 2005-2007, while pay for CEOs in State-owned bodies saw a similar rise of 42 per 
cent on average. Pay for other directors in private companies increased on average by 
between 23 and 28 per cent over the two years. In contrast, inflation over the two years 
was 9.1 per cent (CSO Consumer Price Index). As such, CEOs were paid increases well over 
four times the inflation rate, while other directors were paid well over twice the inflation 
rate. During the same period, average gross incomes increased by 17.5 per cent, according 
to the Survey of Income and Living Conditions (CSO). Furthermore, it should be noted that 
percentage increases disproportionately benefit higher earners (e.g. a ten per cent increase 
on pay of €100,000 is €10,000 whereas a ten per cent increase on €10,000 is only €1,000). 
In general in the economy, in order to narrow the growing gap between high and low pay, 
percentage increases should be the inverse – with high earners gaining less than inflation 
and low earners gaining more as a rule.
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excess of even high rates of pay in the economy. Although directors may expect ‘high 
pay’, there is no reason for the level of remuneration to greatly exceed other well-paid 
occupations. Survey findings from the Survey on Income and Living Conditions show 
that nine out of ten households had a gross annual income of less than €102,000 in 2005, 
less than €111,000 in 2006 and less than €119,000 in 2007. Putting this in another way, 
income above these levels in each year can be defined as ‘high pay’. To put this level of 
pay in context, between 2005 and 2007 over one in six households had a low income that 
made them ‘at risk of poverty’. More than one household in sixteen (6.3 per cent) was in 
consistent poverty during the same period. Hence, high pay between 2005 and 2007 was 
already over ten times the risk of poverty threshold.
Figure 6 – Comparison of directors’ annual remuneration with the normal economy
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3.26 As shown in Table 8 and illustrated in Figure 6, the average pay of directors over the period 
2005-2007 was many times the level of ‘high pay’ (€102,000-€119,000) in the economy as a 
whole. The poverty threshold averaged €10,835 during this period.
3.27 CEOs in private companies in 2005 were paid nearly 11 times (10.9) the ‘high pay’ 
threshold of €102,000 for that year and 110 times the ‘at risk of poverty’ threshold. This 
rose to nearly 14 times (13.6) the high pay threshold of €119,000 in 2007, and 136 times 
the ‘risk of poverty’ threshold. In the 21 companies for which this information was 
available, the lowest CEO payment in 2007 was €140,000 (Kerry Group) and the highest 
was €3,998,000 (Bank of Ireland). The median payment was €1,362,000 (Irish Life and 
Permanent).
3.28 Two additional factors may enhance the above remuneration: share options and loans. 
Board executives typically benefit from share options in private companies and can have 
access to loans on favourable conditions. Professor Gerard Hughes has noted that the 
average annual employer pension contribution in 2008 for executive directors in large 
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28 publicly quoted Irish companies amounted to nearly 46 times more than for other covered 
employees; €124,000 versus €2,700 (Hughes, 2010). These factors can represent significant 
additional financial benefits from board membership beyond the remuneration that is 
typically published in annual reports (and hence available for analysis in this study).
3.29 Out of the seven State-owned bodies in respect of which this information was available, 
CEOs remuneration in 2007 ranged from €251,366 (Enterprise Ireland) and €698,000 
(Dublin Airport Authority). The median level of pay was €461,000 (Bord Gais).
3.30 The pay of non-executive directors in the period 2005 to 2007 was just over half of the 
‘high pay’ threshold (53 to 56 per cent). But it must be remembered that this remuneration 
was for a part-time position that might involve 40 working days a year, or possibly much 
less. The evidence shows that nearly all members of the Director Network had multiple 
directorships for a number of which they would have been paid significant remuneration. 
In 2007, the lowest payment to non-executive directors was €29,777 (Aer Lingus) and the 
highest was €135,000 (ICG). The median payment was €58,970.
3.31 Chairpersons in private companies were paid between €85,000 (Glanbia) and €864,000 
(Grafton Group) in 2007. The median was €200,000, which suggests in this case that the 
arithmetic average (mean) value of €267,600 was skewed upward by a small number of 
high payments.
3.32 Executive directors in private companies were paid between €432,000 (ICG) and 
€1,818,332 (Elan). The median was €745,052, which suggests the mean of €893,857 was 
skewed upwards by a small number of high payments.
3.33 It has been argued that remuneration packages in the Irish banking sector skyrocketed 
from 2000 onwards. Shane Ross describes the regime in Anglo Irish Bank in the 2007-2008 
period: “it is hard to find a more extreme example of corporate gluttony,” (Ross 2009: 61). 
There is evidence that pay to directors of financial institutions was high when compared 
with pay rates enjoyed by comparable directors in other countries. This is shown in the 
Government’s review of pay to bank directors and executives in February 2009 by the 
Covered Institutions Remuneration Oversight Committee (CIROC), which called for up to 
a 64 per cent decrease in their levels based on a comparison with the UK.
3.34 The Government’s bank guarantee scheme included a provision to allow the Government 
to cap remuneration (including base salaries, bonuses and pension levels) for Chief 
Executives, chairs and ordinary board members. The Government stated that it 
considered these to be “in many cases, markedly excessive”. Following the report of 
CIROC, the Government requested lower remuneration terms for financial institutions, 
including a salary cap of €500,000. The Government in fact went beyond the report’s 
recommendations when it sought further decreases in the level of remuneration. This 
evidence suggests that pay was excessive, on the boards of banks at least, in comparison 
with the UK. However, equivalent evidence is not available for other sectors. Table 9 
compares the recommended maximum payment to board members of the main financial 
institutions with their 2007 levels of pay.
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AIB €475,000 €276,000 €76,417 €55,000
Bank of Ireland €483,000 €276,000 €79,666 €55,000
Irish Life & 
Permanent
€320,000 €218,000 €84,143 €44,000
Anglo Irish Bank €431,000 €218,000 €76,375 €44,000
remuneration includes salary, fees, pension contributions, taxable benefits, profit shares and bonuses 
reported in the annual reports for 2007.
3.35 One of the arguments advanced to justify the excessive pay of directors is that a failure 
to pay these rates will result in a ‘loss of talent’, and that this would be detrimental 
to competitiveness. However, there is little evidence to support this argument. The 
market for executive talent in Ireland has never been very competitive or liquid. The 
Government’s own review of Irish bankers’ pay in February 2009 found no evidence that 
retaining senior staff was difficult for the Banks.  Many of those in key positions had not 
been headhunted, but had been promoted from within the organisations.
“if we are driving people away [from 
London] with the types of standards I am 
proposing, you have to question whether we 
would want to keep them anyway,”
Sir David Walker in relation to the UK 
financial services industry
(FairPensions, 2009: 11)
3.36 Crucially, the high pay rates enjoyed by board 
directors must be seen in a context where single 
individuals often hold multiple directorships, and 
draw considerable pay from many of these positions. 
Not only does holding multiple directorships 
potentially mean that individual directors are over-
stretched in terms of carrying out their duties, but it 
also means that companies paying these rates could be 
getting exceedingly poor value for money, in terms of 
the time that these well-paid directors have available 
to dedicate to their duties on multiple boards.
3.37 The eleven most well-connected members of the Director Network, identified in Chapter 
2, earned considerable sums for their work on multiple boards. It has to be remembered 
that these earnings are additional to their earnings either as CEOs or members of senior 
management of companies outside the 40 reviewed in this study, as well as any payments 
from additional directorships. Table 10 gives the total sums earned by each for the 
directorships they held within the 40 private companies and State-owned bodies in this study.
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30 Table 10 – remuneration of the 11 most well-connected members of the director network
REMUNERATION* BOARD POSITIONS
Crowley, Laurence €477,007 (2005) Chair x1NED x1
FitzPatrick, Sean €774,000 Chair x2NED x3
Heraty, Anne €132,083 NED x3
Kennedy, Gary €2,994,575 (2005) Exec Dir x1NED x2
Lynch, Philip €383,000 (2005) NED x3
McCann, Gary €2,760,333
CEO x1
Chair x1
NED x2
McCourt, Declan €147,500 (2006) NED x3
McGowan, Kieran €527,291 NED x5
Neill, Terry €185,000 NED x2  
Somers, Bernard €310,000 NED x4
Sullivan, Ned €428,000 Chair x2NED x1
Source: annual reports
* remuneration includes salary, fees, pension contributions, taxable benefits, profit shares and bonuses 
reported in the annual reports for 2007 for those companies for which information was available, or the 
nearest year where the individual holds the most directorships. Payments to board members of State-
owned bodies are simple averages of total board fees, where this information was not disaggregated in the 
annual reports. remuneration applies only to the 40 top companies in this report, not to pay from additional 
directorships or other employment outside of these companies.
NeD = non-executive director
3.38 The above table shows that well-connected directors were also well-remunerated, 
although this varies greatly. Leaving aside the outliers (one CEO and one executive 
director’s remuneration), payment to non-executive directors was on average over 
€77,000 per position and payment to chairs was on average over €240,000 per position. 
As a consequence of holding multiple directorships, total payments for chairperson or 
non-executive positions averaged €312,646 for each well-connected director. Again, the 
part-time nature of these positions must be noted. Also, the above figures are only for 
the companies in this study, and do not include benefits such as share options, loans, or 
earnings from other management roles, directorships, etc.
3.39 The overlap of interests between a small number of directors is further illustrated when 
we look at the frequency of their representation on the remuneration committees of the 
boards on which they served. For example, in 2007, five of the eleven sat on at least one of 
the remuneration committees of the Interlocking Boards. Figure 7 illustrates this. Arrows 
away from a person indicate influence while arrows towards a person indicate benefit, 
although a double arrow does not necessarily mean that individuals directly set their own 
remuneration, as this report found no evidence of that.
3.40 The Combined Code defines the role of the remuneration committee as follows: “The 
remuneration committee should have delegated responsibility for setting remuneration 
for all executive directors and the chairman, including pension rights and any 
compensation payments. The committee should also recommend and monitor the 
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management’ for this purpose should be determined by the board but should normally 
include the first layer of management below board level.” (June 2008: B 2.2). The function 
of remuneration committees varies from company to company, but they generally fix 
the remuneration level of CEOs and board chairs, whereas the latter sometimes set the 
remuneration of non-executive directors.
Figure 7 – role of 11 well-connected directors on remuneration committees (2007)
Ann Heraty
Gary McCann
Ned Sullivan
Sean FitzPatrick
Smurfit
Anglo Irish Bank Greencore McInerney Holdings
3.41 What the above illustrates is that:
• Sean FitzPatrick, Ann Heraty and Gary McCann were members of the remuneration 
committee of Anglo Irish Bank that set the payment for the chairperson, who was Sean 
FitzPatrick;
• Sean FitzPatrick as chair of Anglo Irish Bank, was involved in setting the remuneration 
of non-executive directors, who included Ann Heraty and Gary McCann;
• Sean FitzPatrick was chair of Smurfit and was a member of the remuneration 
committee of Smurfit, hence involved in setting the remuneration of Gary McCann, 
who was CEO of Smurfit;
• Sean FitzPatrick was a member of the remuneration committee of Greencore, which set 
the remuneration of Ned Sullivan, chair of Greencore. Ned Sullivan was also a member 
of the remuneration committee of Greencore;
• Ned Sullivan was a member of the remuneration committee of McInerney Holdings;
• Many companies report that directors who sit on the remuneration committee are 
not directly involved in setting their own pay; hence it cannot be assumed that these 
individuals were directly involved in setting their own level of remuneration.
3.42 Remuneration and, in particular, the role and work of a board’s remuneration committee 
is acknowledged to be an area where the current system of regulation and governance 
has failed. The growing trend, shared with other economies, towards linking pay to short-
term profitability and inappropriate risk-taking has been a key feature of the recent banking 
failures. The 2003 version of the Combined Code had suggested that all members of 
remuneration committees should be independent, non-executive directors. However the 
2006 changes to the Combined Code allowed chairpersons to sit on (but not chair) sub-
committees on remuneration, even when those sub-committees set those chairpersons’ 
level of pay. More than two-thirds of companies in the 2010 Grant Thornton corporate 
governance survey availed of this option, of which four, in contravention of the Code, 
confirmed that the chair of the board also chaired the remuneration committee (Grant 
Thornton, 2010). 
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32 3.43 In the UK, it is argued that remuneration committees have failed to impose effective 
controls on directors’ remuneration, pensions, options and bonuses. The reasons for these 
failures include an element of ‘capture’ (the non-executives on the committee do not wish 
to fall out with their executive colleagues) and self-interest (higher executive pay has a 
ratchet effect on non-executive pay) (Hannigan, 2009: 7).
3.44 In the financial sector globally, excessive remuneration paid to both executive and non-
executive board members has distorted the incentive structure in the sector, encouraging 
risk-taking and short-term profits rather than sustained company performance. This 
has led the G-20 to agree on reforming compensation practices to support financial 
stability through a number of measures, in particular by ensuring the independence of 
compensation committees which oversee compensation policies (G-20, September 2009).
3.45 A recent OECD review finds that remuneration systems “have often failed because 
negotiations and decisions are not carried out at arm’s length. Managers and others have 
had too much influence over the level and conditions for performance-based remuneration, 
with boards unable or incapable of exercising objective, independent judgement.” (OECD, 
June 2009: 7). In the absence of any statutory (or even culturally-imposed) ceiling on pay, 
the independence of non-executive directors is the strongest available mechanism to ensure 
proper governance of remuneration/incentive systems. 
4. The Financial Sector
334. The Financial sector
4.1 At this point it is important to note the central role played by financial institutions in 
the 33 Interlocking Boards. The three most-tightly interwoven boards were all financial 
institutions: Anglo Irish Bank with ten links, and Irish Life and Permanent and Bank 
of Ireland, which each had nine links to other companies. Allied Irish Bank (AIB) also 
had a large number of links, to seven other firms. These links are shown in Figure 8. As 
illustrated, only four companies did not have a director sitting on the board of one of the 
four financial institutions.
Figure 8 – Financial institutions’ influence in the interlocking boards
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34 4.2 The extent to which the boards of all four financial institutions were interwoven with 
other major enterprises illustrates the extent to which the corporate governance of 
these bodies may have been weakened because of the other commitments of their 
board members. The UK’s Walker Review recommends that non-executive directors 
on the boards of banks should be expected to give greater time commitment than has 
been normal in the past. The UK Treasury Select Committee report on the banking 
crisis identified the lack of time many non-executives devote to their role, with many 
combining a senior full-time position with multiple non-executive directorships, as one of 
the key problems (TSC, 15 May 2009).
4.3 Niall FitzGerald,  the former chairperson and CEO of Unilever Europe and chairperson of 
Reuters,  asked bank director friends in summer 2009 “Were they aware of the risks that 
were being taken and thus ‘complicit with the recklessness’ or were they unaware of what 
was going on and thus failing to discharge their responsibilities as directors.” (Irish Times, 
6 March 2010) 
4.4 As noted in Chapter 2, each of the eleven most-connected members of the Director Network 
was on the board of one of the four financial institutions. In fact, a total of 24 out of 39 
members of the Director Network sat on a board of one of the four. This is shown in Table 11.
Table 11 – Overlap between director network and financial institutions
AIB ANGLO IRISH BANK
Kennedy, Gary
McGuckian, John
O’Connor, Dan
Somers, Bernard
Sullivan, Michael J
Bradshaw, Lar 
Drury, Fintan 
FitzPatrick, Sean 
Heraty, Anne 
McCann, Gary 
Sullivan, Ned
BANK OF IRELAND IRISH LIFE AND PERMANENT
Crowley, Laurence 
Dilger, David 
Haran, Paul 
Hodgkinson, Michael 
MacSharry, Ray 
McCourt, Declan 
Moran, Thomas 
Neill, Terry 
Bowler, Gillian 
Byrne, David 
Gray, Danuta 
Lynch, Philip 
McGowan, Kieran 
4.5 The strongest concentration of interlocking directors was found within the financial 
services sector. The 24 directors held a total of 63 directorships between them across 25 
boards, which is over two-thirds of the total number of multiple directorships among 
the Interlocking Boards. They also accounted for almost 68 per cent of the 398 additional 
directorships held by all in the Director Network.
4.6 Although no one individual director sat on the boards of two or more financial 
institutions, seven companies had different members of their boards on the boards of two 
or even three financial institutions. This is shown in Figure 9. Aer Lingus and CRH had 
board members on the boards of three financial institutions, while the DDDA, Dublin 
Airport Authority, Elan, Greencore and United Drug had members on the boards of two 
financial institutions. This level of connection with the main financial institutions raises 
4. The Financial Sector
35the legitimate question of whether there could be a conflict of loyalties created if these 
companies (or their suppliers/clients) came to seek major loans from the same institutions.
Figure 9 – Companies with directors on the boards of two or three financial institutions
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36 4.7 Anglo Irish Bank was linked across the public and private sectors, with connections to the 
construction sector, the transport sector, the pharmaceutical sector and four of the State-
owned bodies. Its connections are highlighted in Figure 10.
Figure 10 – anglo irish bank’s links to other interlocking boards
Anglo Irish Bank
Greencore
Dublin Airport Authority
Aer Lingus
DDDA
Smurfit
United Drug
Paddy Power
Bord na Mona
Forfás
McInerney Holdings
IAWS
Irish Life 
and Permanent C&C
Enterprise Ireland
IAA
Glanbia
Fyffes
ElanKingspan
Grafton Group CRH
Central BankKerry Group
Independent News & Media Eirgrid
IDA
Eircom
AIB
ICG
DCC
Ryanair
Bank of Ireland
4. The Financial Sector
374.8 Irish Life and Permanent and Bank of Ireland were both linked to the construction, 
transportation, food and drink and pharmaceutical industries, as well as important public 
bodies including the DDDA and Enterprise Ireland. AIB also had a significant number of 
connections. The connections of each institution are highlighted in Figures 11, 12 and 13 
respectively.
Figure 11 – irish life and permanent’s links to other interlocking boards
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38 Figure 12 – bank of ireland’s links to other interlocking boards
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39Figure 13 – aib’s links to other interlocking boards
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40 4.9 The response to the international banking crisis indicates the need for stricter rules and 
regulations governing banks, compared to other companies. There is a strong argument 
that the systemic importance of banks, and the likelihood of public money being used 
to prop them up, needs to be counter-balanced by statutory regulation, rather than a 
voluntary code.
4.10 In the context of the financial institutions’ ‘systemic’ importance to the Irish economy, 
Table 12 illustrates their total assets for 2007. This can be compared against their 
operating income, which is comparable to smaller private companies – and hence less of a 
justification for the exceptionally high level of remuneration that occurred for members of 
their boards. Although bank ‘assets’ are very large, these differ from other companies insofar 
as banks’ business activity involves financial transactions and does not generate these assets.
Table 12 – Financial services assets and Operating income
COMPANY TOTAL ASSETS 2007 €M OPERATING INCOME 2007 €M
AIB €177,862 €4,868
Bank of Ireland €197,483 €4,120
Anglo Irish Bank €96,652 €1,761
Irish Life and Permanent €80,062 €1,152
4.11 In Ireland’s case, the continuing influence of a small number of well-connected individuals 
in the main financial institutions suggests that reform is needed in this area. Examples of 
this are given in Box 1.
BOx 1. CONTINuING INfLuENCE IN IRELAND’S MAIN BANKS
In the main financial institutions included in this review some recent appointments are more a 
reshuffle of many of the same players rather than any real increase in diversity. More recent changes 
show the continued influence of many of the same people. 
• Dan O’Connor was on the Board of AIB since 2007 and has become its executive chairperson (in 
breach of the Combined Codes of Corporate Governance guidelines that precludes a former CEO 
serving as chairperson of the same company) (Sunday Tribune, 15 November 2009);
• The new CEO of Bank of Ireland is Richie Boucher, former head of the Bank’s core Irish retail 
division and an existing board member (Irish Times, 26 February 2009);
• Pat Molloy, a former Chief Executive of Bank of Ireland has taken over as chairperson (RTÉ News, 9 
June 2009);
• Liam O’Reilly, former financial regulator, was on the board of Irish Life and Permanent from 
September 2008 until early 2010 (Irish Independent, 26 March 2010);
• Gillian Bowler remains in place as chair of Irish Life and Permanent (RTÉ News, 13 February 2009);
• Irish Life and Permanent’s new CEO is Kevin Murphy, former manager of its life business (Irish 
Times, 18 June 2009);
• The board of Anglo Irish Bank includes Maurice Keane, the former Bank of Ireland Chief 
Executive (Irish Times, 12 March 2010).
5. Public and Private: Two Spheres – One Circle
415. public and private: Two spheres – One Circle
5.1 The existence of a small number of interconnected business people in key governance 
positions is not confined to the private sector. It is important to be clear why the issue 
of interlocking directorships between boards of State-owned organisations and private 
companies can be problematic. In theory, there can be useful interaction between the two 
sectors, and it is good practice to have people from a mixture of backgrounds on boards. 
Indeed, the State has often been indebted to the businessmen and women who have placed 
their expertise at the disposal of public bodies However, the primary remit of State-owned 
bodies is, through their activities, to serve the common good. Hence, it is particularly 
important to ensure that the governance of public sector organisations is transparent 
and that they are safeguarded from any potential conflicts of interest. Such conflicts of 
interest could arise if directors on public sector boards have private interests which could 
compromise the interests of the State-owned body.
5.2 There are considerable director linkages between the listed companies and the State-
owned bodies in our sample. Thus, there is a significant overlap between those who are 
responsible ultimately to the citizen, and those who are primarily responsible to market 
interests (shareholders). Interlocking directorships connect seven of the 14 State-owned 
bodies to 12 of the 26 private companies.  These connections are illustrated in Figure 14.
5.3 These kinds of linkages appear to be common. In Ireland, many of the same people who 
work in, or sit on the boards of, private or listed companies are recruited to the boards of 
State-owned companies, with responsibilities in the same sector. The converse also occurs 
whereby former senior public service officials are recruited to the boards of private 
In terms of legal status, there are two 
principal categories of state enterprise – 
those established as statutory corporations 
by a piece of legislation that details their 
role, relationship to government and 
other such details, and those established 
as companies and which are incorporated 
under the Companies Acts.
(MacCarthaigh, M, 2008: 93)
companies. For example, Central Bank directors 
moved on to the boards of commercial banks once 
their terms of office in the Central Bank were over. 
There have also been instances of AIB and Bank of 
Ireland directors sitting simultaneously on the board 
of the Central Bank. And the CEO of the Financial 
Regulator’s office was appointed on his retirement to 
the board of Irish Life and Permanent (Ross, 2009:71).
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42 Figure 14 – Overlap between the boards of private companies and state-owned bodies
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435.4 The fact that one in four of the Director Network simultaneously sat on the boards of both 
State-owned and private companies is just one indication of the blurring of boundaries 
between public and private spheres. Half of the eleven most well-connected directors 
sat on the boards of both private companies and State-owned bodies. For example, Sean 
FitzPatrick was a member of the DDDA and was also a Government appointee to the Board 
of Aer Lingus. Anne Heraty sat on two State agencies: Forfás and Bord na Mona.
5.5 Moreover, at least half of the Director Network have at some time sat on one of the State-
owned Interlocking Boards, or chaired a State-owned board not in our study, or held a 
senior position in the Irish public service. For example: Gillian Bowler (Chair of Fáilte 
Ireland); Fintan Drury (Chair of the RTÉ Authority); Sean Dorgan (CEO of IDA); Kieran 
McGowan (CEO of IDA); Paul Haran (Secretary General of the Department of Enterprise, 
Trade and Employment); Brian Hillery (former TD); Ray MacSharry (former Minister for 
Finance) and David Byrne (former Attorney General and EU commissioner).
5.6 The current controversy over the performance of the Dublin Docklands Development 
Authority (DDDA), a State Development Agency, and its ties to Anglo Irish Bank is a 
salient example of the degree to which the boundaries between the public and the private 
sectors have become blurred, with consequences which are inimical to the public interest. 
DDDA chair, Niamh Brennan, who was appointed to the post in March 2009, noting 
the involvement of Sean FitzPatrick and Lar Bradshaw on the boards of the DDDA and 
Anglo Irish Bank, said that because of Anglo’s influence, the DDDA “became very focused 
on development and used planning to facilitate and encourage development” and that 
“The association between Anglo and the DDDA has not served the authority well.”(The	
Sunday	Tribune,	14	March	2010). The links between the DDDA and private companies are 
highlighted in Figure 15.
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5. Public and Private: Two Spheres – One Circle
455.7 An IPA study of non-commercial State companies concluded that “current appointment 
mechanisms do not ensure that all the expertise needed on the board is appointed to it,” 
even though “boards play a particularly important role in monitoring financial and policy 
progress” (McGauran et al, 2005: xviii). The survey found that, while non-commercial 
State agencies had significant autonomy in the development of policy, accountability 
mechanisms were poorly developed. Systems for financial accountability were more 
strongly developed but paradoxically a lack of autonomy in this area meant that there 
were few incentives for agencies to economise with their funding and there was a lack of 
monitoring and accountability in relation to the link between funding and its effective use 
(ibid: 154). 
5.8 The UK Code of Practice for Ministerial Appointments to Public Bodies identifies five 
issues most frequently encountered when making appointments which could lead to real 
or apparent conflicts of interest. One of these relates to relationships and associations, 
including those of friendship and the potential for such to either influence actions or 
be perceived as doing so. The Code recommends that such an issue is sufficient grounds 
for excluding a candidate from appointment. Other such grounds include the potential 
perception of the appointment as a reward for past or future contributions or favours, 
and circumstances where awareness of pending Government policy arising from a board 
position could represent an unfair advantage for those with related business interests. For 
all of these reasons, TASC has argued elsewhere that Ireland needs an independent system 
of appointments to all public bodies (Clancy and Murphy 2006).
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Company Boards
A typical board of directors comprises a 
number of non-executive directors, of whom 
one is the chairperson, and a number of 
executive directors, of whom one is the 
chief executive officer (CEO). In the case of 
some state-owned bodies, the board does 
not include the CEO or other organisation 
executives.
The role of the chairperson is to lead the 
Board in executing its responsibilities. S/
he is responsible for leadership of the board, 
ensuring its effectiveness in all aspects of 
its role and setting its agenda so that fully 
adequate time is available for substantive 
discussion on strategic issues.
An important function of the chairperson 
is to guide the non-executive directors in 
addressing any conflict of interest that 
might arise because of the dual role of 
executive directors as employees of the 
company and as board directors. The 
role and accountability of non-executive 
directors needs to be centre stage so as to 
prevent over-concentration of power and 
control with the management team.
6.1 The global financial and economic crisis has 
revealed a financial system driven by short-termism, 
involving speculative and irresponsible behaviour on 
the part of the banking sector and its investors. When 
it came to a head in 2008/09 it triggered widespread 
reappraisal of governance systems internationally. 
In the context of the global economic crisis, and the 
particular failures that led to the generally worse 
situation in Ireland, one of the clear messages must 
be that corporate governance matters. Failures by 
boards of directors to prevent excessive risk-taking 
and short-term profiteering at the expense of long-
term sustainability must be seen as one of the factors 
exacerbating the crisis in Ireland.
6.2 Such failures are by no means confined to the 
financial sector – or, indeed, to the private sector. 
Other major failures have occurred among the top 
40 companies: in the case of the State-owned DDDA, 
the economic consequences of failures of governance 
have been widely recognised; the State agency FÁS 
was at the centre of a high-profile scandal resulting in 
the resignation of its board; and there has also been 
strong criticism of the part played by the Central 
Bank in the context of the financial crisis. Before 
the current recession there were a number of high- 
profile compliance failures in Ireland, and the most 
recent Grant Thornton report shows a worsening 
position, although this is interpreted in a positive 
light as the result of increasing levels of disclosure. 
What this implies is that compliance was over the 
years much worse that previously known. The latest 
report also comments that there is significant room 
for improvement in the quality of disclosure (Grant 
Thornton, 2010).
6.3 The most recent Grant Thornton report (2010) revealed that nearly two-thirds of all listed 
companies were non-compliant, for example, failing to comply with the provision in the 
Code precluding a former CEO serving as chairperson of the same company. Although the 
role of Sean FitzPatrick in Anglo Irish Bank was the most high profile case, other examples 
where this occurred in the 40 companies in our study include Grafton Group, C&C and 
Kingspan. The rationale for this provision is that a former executive of a company cannot 
be sufficiently independent to serve as an effective chairperson. There is also the concern 
that non-executive directors become disempowered. It is important to note that full 
compliance for other listed companies cannot be assumed, since the absence of disclosure 
does not imply compliance.
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Corporate Governance is...
“the system by which companies are directed 
and controlled” 
– Cadbury Report (UK)
“the set of rules applicable to the direction 
and control of a company” 
– Cardon Report (Belgium)
“the major principles and frameworks 
which regulate the interaction between the 
company’s managerial bodies, the owners, 
as well as other parties directly influenced 
by the company’s dispositions and business 
(in this context jointly referred to as the 
company’s stakeholders). Stakeholders 
including employees, creditors, suppliers, 
customers and the local community.” 
– Nørby Report (Denmark)
 “a code of conduct for those associated 
with the company... consisting of a set of 
rules for sound management and proper 
supervision and for a division of duties and 
responsibilities and powers effecting the 
satisfactory balance of influence of all the 
stakeholders.” 
– Peters Report (Netherlands)
“the legal and factual  regulatory framework 
for managing and supervising a company.” 
– Berlin Initiative Code (Germany)
6.4 More recently, little has changed. When Dan 
O’Connor was appointed AIB’s executive chairperson 
in breach of corporate governance guidelines, the 
Corporate Governance Association of Ireland (CGAI) 
issued a statement expressing its concern but for 
reasons that are unclear the Irish Association of 
Investment Managers (IAIM), which represents 
institutional investors, did not object (Sunday 
Business Post, 22 Nov 2009).
6.5 Good corporate governance requires non-
executive board directors to be independent, 
competent to do the job and responsible to all 
stakeholders. These characteristics assume that 
individual directors truly act at ‘arms-length’ from 
the executive of the company and uphold the 
interests of stakeholders. When the characteristics 
of good governance are in place, boards – especially 
non-executive directors – have an important role 
in scrutinising a company’s plans and activities 
to ensure these are not short-term and ultimately 
damaging to the organisation. While this may 
constrain the immediate ambitions of management, 
the counter-balance of a board providing scrutiny and 
a longer-term perspective is more likely to benefit the 
organisation and its wider stakeholders.
6.6 In Ireland, the existing regulatory framework 
affecting private listed companies is ‘light touch’. 
Companies listed on the Irish Stock Exchange are 
required to disclose their compliance with the UK 
Combined Code on Corporate Governance, although 
the Code does not form part of the Listing Rules of 
the Exchange. The Combined Code on Corporate 
Governance sets out standards of good practice 
relating to board composition and development, 
remuneration, accountability, audit systems and 
relations with shareholders. All UK incorporated 
companies with a primary listing are required under 
the Listing Rules to report on how they have applied 
the Code in their annual report and accounts, and 
either to confirm that they have complied with the 
Code’s provisions or – where they have not – to provide an explanation for their failure to 
do so (a process known as ‘comply or explain’).
6.7 In continental Europe there are significant differences in how boards and corporate 
governance operate. While no single system has emerged as superior, it is important 
to note that there is a wide range of options for changes in Ireland based on successful 
practice in other countries. Some sample features of continental corporate governance 
that could be considered include: the legal requirement of employee representation on the 
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boards in Norway; and enhanced accounting requirements in the USA.
6.8 The banking crisis and the economic recession are widely attributed, at least in part, 
to widespread failures of corporate governance, and not just in the financial sector. In 
acknowledgement of this, a review of the governance of banks and other financial institutions 
was established in the UK (the Walker Review), together with a parallel review of the UK’s 
Combined Code to reassess corporate governance in other listed companies. The subsequent 
reform proposals include strengthened principles and guidelines on a range of issues including 
the role of the chair and the non-executive directors, the handling of risk and the alignment of 
pay with the long-term interests of the company.
6.9 In Ireland, so far, there has been a review of the pay of those bank boards which came under 
the bank guarantee scheme. There has also been a review of the code of practice for the 
governance of public bodies. The Minister for Finance, Brian Lenihan, is on record as saying 
that he would bring in measures to clamp down on crony capitalism in Ireland, including 
a ban on cross-directorships. The Renewed Programme for Government (10 October 2009) 
made a commitment to put the principles of the Combined Code of Corporate Governance 
on a legislative footing for all listed companies, as well as State-sponsored bodies, in relation 
to a number of issues. These included: board composition and independence; segregation of 
CEO and Chair; clear definition of executive and non-executive responsibilities; selection of 
non-executive directors; and sanctions for non-compliance. However, notwithstanding these 
proposals, there seems to be a reluctance on the part of Government to acknowledge the scale 
of the crisis and the need for fundamental reform. For example, the Tánaiste and then Minister 
for Enterprise, Trade and Employment, Mary Coughlan, addressing the Irish Stock Exchange 
in January 2010, asserted that “A balance must be struck between necessary regulation 
and avoiding unnecessary administrative burdens, which would only serve to hinder Irish 
companies’ efforts to regain competitiveness, improve productivity, and increase exports” 
(Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment, 2010).
6.10 Furthermore, as recently as 2009, in its response to the FRC review of the Combined Code, 
the Irish Stock Exchange stated that “we believe that the Code is generally operating well 
and facilitating listed companies in adopting good corporate governance procedures … other 
than our comments regarding the roles of the chairman, the CEO and the Board, we are not 
aware of any aspects of good governance practice that are not currently addressed by the Code 
or its related guidance.” (FRC, March 2009). This sentiment was echoed in the review of the 
Combined Code currently being conducted in the UK, which states “While the Combined 
Code and its related guidance require some updating, it remains broadly fit for purpose.” 
(FRC, December 2009). The above shows a continuing strong commitment among market 
participants to the failed concept of ‘self-regulation’.
6.11 The OECD review of corporate governance argues that “it appears difficult and perhaps 
impossible to find a ‘silver bullet’ in the form of laws and regulations to improve board 
performance” (OECD, June 2009: 9). However, the failures that prompted the recent focus on 
governance and regulatory failure are having such a profound impact on the lives of ordinary 
people that it is no longer sufficient to simply reform governance systems to better protect 
shareholders. The only conclusion that can be drawn from the evidence, both here and in other 
countries, is that ‘self-regulation’ has not delivered good governance. Hence, there is a strong 
case for legislative action to address the inadequacy of existing guidelines/rules on numbers of 
directorships, cross-directorships, multiplicity of roles and remuneration. 
6. Reform of Corporate Governance
496.12 It seems clear that legislation relating to multiple directorships is necessary, substantially 
restricting the number an individual can hold. The limit of twenty-five directorships (not 
including subsidiaries) introduced by the Companies (Amendment) (No. 2) Act 1999 now 
needs significant reform in light of experience. In particular, there is a strong case to be 
made for reducing or eliminating the practice of cross-directorships, whereby a director 
from company A sits on the board of company B, and a director from company B sits on 
the board of company A at the same time. At a minimum, if this practice is retained, cross-
directorships should be governed by stricter and more transparent rules.
6.13 In relation to the issue of adequate time to properly fulfil the duties of a board director, 
while the current proposals to strengthen the Combined Code of Governance include a 
new statement that directors must be able to properly fulfil their duties, this still falls short 
of providing clear guidance on the number of directorships which may be held at any one 
time. Furthermore, the Higgs Review recommended that a board should not agree to a full 
time executive director taking on more than one non-executive directorship in a publicly-
quoted company, or the chairpersonship of such a company (Higgs, January 2003).
6.14 Tighter criteria for ensuring the independence, objectivity and competence of directors, 
in both private and State-owned companies, are needed. The recent OECD report on the 
main messages to emerge from the failures of corporate governance and their links to the 
financial crisis usefully discusses the notion of extending the concept of a ‘fit and proper 
person’ test. To date, this test has been used by regulatory authorities in relation to the 
banking sector, because the systemic importance of this sector requires greater oversight. 
However, this has been confined solely to an assessment in terms of fraud and history of 
bankruptcy. The report now suggests that there is a case for this test to be expanded to 
cover not only technical and professional competence, but also the issues of independence 
and objectivity (OECD, June 2009: 45).
6.15 Rules governing decisions on remuneration and/or loans to directors or employees should 
be reformed. In particular, it is time to start a national debate on the question of a cap on 
the salaries and bonuses of CEOs and senior management so as to promote greater social 
equality as well as to encourage prudent, long-term behaviour rather than the reckless, 
short-term pursuit of profit. It is questionable whether the current available remedies are 
sufficiently robust to address this problem.
COrpOraTe gOvernanCe OF sTaTe-Owned COMpanies
6.16 At a minimum, the same standards of corporate governance should apply to State-owned 
bodies as apply to private companies. Furthermore State-owned bodies should be governed 
by additional standards to ensure their non-profit, public interest activities are safeguarded. 
Irish State-owned bodies currently operate according to their own code, the Code of Practice 
for the Governance of State Bodies. First introduced in 1992, it was updated in 2001 and most 
recently revised in June 2009. The Code of Practice is intended to ensure that State bodies 
serve the interests of the citizen, pursue value for money in their endeavours (including 
managing risk appropriately), and act transparently as public entities.
6.17 The Code of Practice sets out its raison	d’etre thus: “High standards of corporate governance 
in all State Agencies, whether in the commercial or non-commercial sphere, are critical 
to ensuring a positive contribution to the State’s overall economic efficiency and 
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the Combined Code for listed companies. It also fails to cover a number of important 
regulatory agencies, including the Central Bank.
6.18 A cavalier approach on behalf of the State to the democratic basis for transparency and 
accountability is reflected in the difficulties experienced in the course of this research 
in accessing the same level of information on State companies as is available on private 
(listed) companies. The 2001 guidelines (operable in the period covered by this study) 
state that the chairperson’s annual report should include a schedule of the fees and the 
aggregate expenses paid to each director. As described above, in general, information on 
remuneration within State-owned bodies was provided in the aggregate, which (while 
strictly complying with the letter of the Code) ignores the higher standard set for listed 
companies. In some cases, no information on fees was provided at all in the written 
documentation and, when directly requested to provide it, a number of State bodies 
refused and proposed that we submit a Freedom of Information (FOI) request. Yet others 
would not provide the information and are not covered by the FOI Act. The Code was 
updated in 2009 but appears to demand little more transparency than was the case under 
the 2001 guidelines.
6.19 Following a series of controversies during the early 1990s, mechanisms were put in place 
to increase the accountability of central Government. Such mechanisms include, for 
example, the enactment of Freedom of Information and Ethics in Public Office legislation, 
as well as the recently updated Code of Practice for the Governance of State Boards. 
However, while all these measures were designed to foster a culture of transparency and 
accountability, they often stop short at the door of public bodies – or, more precisely, 
at the boardroom door.  Too many public bodies are specifically exempted from such 
oversight legislation. These exemptions were addressed comprehensively by TASC in 2006 
in Outsourcing Government. The conclusion was drawn then that there was evidence 
that at least some exclusions of public bodies from accountability legislation result from 
deliberate decisions by Government departments, indicating a real resistance to moving 
to open and accountable Government. A recent speech delivered by the Ombudsman and 
Information Commissioner confirms that this culture continues to hold sway.
6.20 The Information Commissioner, Emily O’Reilly, commented that “not only are some 
public bodies not included [under Freedom of Information] but in recent years a practice 
has developed of removing public bodies or functions of public bodies from the scope 
of the FOI Acts” and she concludes that “One can only wonder at the governance 
arrangements that permit this piecemeal and sectional approach to FOI policy which 
completely ignores the public interest in favour of political and administrative 
pragmatism.” (O’Reilly 2010)
6.21 TASC argues that a more open system of public decision-making is essential to dealing 
with the crisis in governance across both the public and private sectors. Procedures to 
ensure openness will make Governments more directly accountable to the citizens for the 
functioning of State-owned bodies. In turn, more open Government will allow citizens 
to question the Government on any laxity that remains within the rules and regulations 
governing the private sector. Elsewhere, TASC has also made the case that Ireland needs an 
independent system of appointments to all public bodies (Clancy and Murphy 2006). At a 
time when Government influence and control over the financial services sector is growing, 
and includes control over a number of appointments to the boards of these companies, the 
issue of an independent system has become even more critical.
6. Reform of Corporate Governance
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6.22 While adequate regulation (and implementation of that regulation) governing numbers 
of directorships, cross-directorships, multiplicity of roles, selection and remuneration 
must be addressed and forms an important part of the solution to governance problems 
in both the public and the private sectors, such regulation in itself will not address a far 
more fundamental issue:  the need to ensure that the public interest is central to corporate 
governance. The basic motivation of private companies must be restated in a way that 
incorporates the public interest, while there must also be far greater accountability and 
transparency in the way our State-owned organisations are run.
6.23 For a company to function in the public interest, it must be run in a manner which 
protects its long-term viability and is consistent with the general welfare of the economy 
and society as a whole. Reasons for regulating in the public interest include the need to 
provide for market failure; to redistribute resources; to provide for unemployment, ill-
health and old age; and to limit the damage to the environment.
6.24 Currently, both company law and the voluntary Combined Code on Corporate 
Governance are structured so as to protect ‘shareholder interests’. The pre-eminence 
given to shareholders is linked to the notion of maximising ‘shareholder value’ (a stock 
market’s valuation of a company’s shares). However, there is considerable evidence that 
this shareholder value model brings with it significant adverse economic and social 
consequences, not least greater income and wealth inequalities in society as a whole. 
(McSweeney, 2008: 21-22).
6.25 Not all companies are focussed on maximising shareholder value, and many countries 
and regions have laws which insist on wider interests being taken into account in 
corporate decision-making. About half of the states in the US have enacted some form 
of stakeholder-oriented laws (primarily concerning a corporation’s employees). Other 
business models exist in most of Europe (excepting Ireland the UK) which seek to protect 
not just investors but a wider set of stakeholders – including employees and customers. 
For example, some German companies are governed by boards on which workers and 
management are equally represented.
6.26 A key part of the solution must include addressing the issue of shareholder behaviour, 
especially institutional shareholders. The recent OECD report on the relationship between 
corporate governance and the financial crisis noted that, in some instances, because of 
a shareholder focus on short-term gains, attention to “the effect of excessive risk taking 
policies” on the part of the company’s management was neglected (OECD, June 2009: 
53). Many institutional investors have little proactive engagement with companies to 
manage risk. Citizens (end-beneficiaries such as pension fund members and life and 
pension policyholders) affected by the behaviour of private companies and/or financial 
institutions such as pension funds, which theoretically represent their interests, have no 
direct say in the decisions they take.
6.27 A new frame of reference for stronger corporate governance must rest on a fundamental 
shift from the failed notion of ‘shareholder value’ to real stakeholder involvement. A new 
legislative framework could include an obligation to make the board’s overriding duty 
the promotion of the long-term success of the company. This could include a statutory 
definition of stakeholders, thus obliging boards to have regard to the interests of wider 
stakeholders such as customers, employees and society at large. Other options include 
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companies are independently appointed, and establishing quotas to ensure diversity 
on boards, possibly involving employees and customers. It could also include reforms 
such as disclosure of voting records, reporting in a manner which end-beneficiaries can 
easily evaluate and provision for statements on environmental and social impact (see for 
example: OECD, June 2009: 53-54; FairPensions, September 2009).
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A1.1 The time period for the study was 2005-2007, which was the final part of the ‘Celtic Tiger’ 
period in the Irish economy, just prior to the collapse in the Irish economy from 2008. The 
study sought to test the hypothesis that the boards of top Irish businesses and State-owned 
bodies were run by a small pool of well-connected individuals.
A1.2 Step one in the study was to identify a group of Ireland’s leading private companies and 
State-owned bodies. 
A1.3 It was beyond the scope of this study to examine all of Ireland’s top private companies. 
Hence the decision was taken to limit the study to private companies with (a) primary 
or dual listings on the Irish Stock Exchange, and placed in the top 250 of the influential 
Irish Times Top 1000 Companies List, or (b) those financial companies that held primary 
or dual listings on the Irish Stock Exchange, and were included in the Top 10 of the Irish 
Times Top 80 Financial Companies. These selection criteria identified companies that are 
important to the economy while, crucially, also ensuring that the researchers had access 
to consistent and comparable information about the companies under examination, as all 
companies listed on the Irish Stock Exchange have to provide certain basic information 
about their boards of directors in their annual reports.
A1.4 The result of the application of the above criteria was that 24 private companies were 
identified for inclusion in the study. Two additional companies were included that were 
not listed on the Irish Stock Exchange: Fyffes and Eircom. These were added to the study 
because of a qualitative assessment of their importance to the Irish economy. Fyffes is one 
of the oldest major companies in the country dating back to the 1880s, while Eircom was 
a publicly-quoted company until it was de-listed in August 2006, mid-way through the 
period of this review.
A1.5 The 14 State-owned bodies include commercial enterprises, economic development 
agencies and business regulatory bodies. Their selection was based on a review of the IPA 
and TASC lists of public bodies (McGauran et al, 2005; Clancy and Murphy, 2006), with 
the aim of including those State-owned bodies that were assessed as important to the 
economy.
A1.6 Table 13 lists the 40 top companies examined in this research, grouped by industry and 
whether private or State-owned. In total (based on available data, see Table 1) these 
companies employed over 310,000 people and had a combined turnover/annual budget/
operating income of nearly €80 billion in 2007.
Mapping the Golden Circle —TASC 2010
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PRIVATE COMPANIES STATE-OWNED BODIES
Financial services
Anglo Irish Bank
AIB
Bank of Ireland
Irish Life and Permanent
The Central Bank
Construction
CRH
Kingspan
The Grafton Group
McInerney Holdings
DDDA
Transportation
Aer Lingus
ICG
Ryanair
CIE
Dublin Airport Authority
Irish Aviation Authority
Food Industry
C&C
Fyffes
Glanbia
Greencore
IAWS
The Kerry Group
-
Energy Dragon OilTullow Oil
Bord Gais
Bord na Mona
ESB
Eirgrid
Other
DCC
Eircom
Elan
INM
Paddy Power
Smurfit
United Drug
An Post
Enterprise Ireland
FÁS
Forfás
IDA
A1.7 Step two in the study was to identify whether (and if so, how many) of the directors on the 
boards of the 40 top companies held directorships on two or more of the 40 companies.
A1.8 The annual reports of all 40 companies were examined for the years 2005, 2006 and 2007. 
This identified a total of 572 unique individuals who held directorships on one or more of 
the boards of the 40 companies. Within this group, a total of 39 individual directors held 
two or more directorships within the 40 companies. These 39 directors were identified 
as the Director Network (see Glossary for the definition of terms used in this report). The 
remaining 533 directors held one directorship within the 40 companies.
A1.9 A total of 33 out of the 40 top companies were found to be linked, through the presence 
of one or more members of the Director Network on their board of directors. These 
companies were identified as having Interlocking Boards.
A1.10 Step three of the study was a network analysis to show the extent of connection between 
members of the Director Network and between the 33 companies who shared directors. 
The result of this analysis was the set of figures presented in this report that show links 
between individuals and between companies. See in particular, Figure 1 and Figure 2 in 
Chapter 2.
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A1.11 From the network analysis it was possible to identify the eleven most well-connected 
members of the Director Network. See Chapter 2.
A1.12 Step four of the study was to examine the additional characteristics of the 39 members of 
the Director Network, such as whether they had further directorships in the wider private 
sector, the level of remuneration they received for their role on boards, etc. This involved 
looking at additional information in the annual reports of the 33 top companies with 
Interlocking Boards, such as their role on the boards and the level of remuneration paid to 
board members.
A1.13 Further information about the 39 members of the Director Network was gained through 
SoloCheck, which is a commercial service offering access to Companies Registration Office 
documents. The full SoloCheck data is provided in Appendix 2. In particular, this service 
permitted the study to identify any additional directorships held by the members of the 
Director Network.
A1.14 The above sources of information were also used to identify information about the eleven 
most well-connected directors.
A1.15 Step five of the study was to examine all of the above findings and to discuss legitimate 
questions that the findings raised for the researchers, in terms of good corporate 
governance and the safeguarding of the public interest.
Mapping the Golden Circle —TASC 2010
56 appendix 2: soloCheck data
All SoloCheck data is sourced from the Companies Registration Office.
NAME CO. NO. COMPANY NAME DIRECTOR SINCE
DIRECTOR 
UNTIL
Bowler, Gillian 8149 Grafton Group plc 14/06/1995  
50550 Clear Channel Ireland Ltd 01/04/1997  
216828 Pathfinder (Ireland) Limited 26/11/1998  
222332 Irish Life & Permanent plc 21/04/1999  
16387 Riordan’s Travel Limited 18/10/1995 12/10/2007
41822 Thomson Holidays Limited 27/03/1998 06/11/2007
51605 Budget Travel Limited  12/10/2007
155581 Tgt (No 14) 02/11/1990 06/11/2007
197643 The Institute of Directors in Ireland 25/04/1994 08/02/2005
216848 Budget Breaks Limited 01/06/1994 18/10/2007
242742 Tui Travel (Ireland) 09/03/1998 08/10/2007
327131 Social Innovations Foundation Ireland Limited 06/06/2001 21/02/2006
336370 Tourism Ireland Limited 28/05/2003 07/12/2005
Bradshaw, Lar 126018 Helix Health Limited 25/04/2007  
411144 Project Orbis (Ireland) Limited 10/01/2006  
420154 Equity Expansion Limited 20/10/2006  
429560 Helix Health Group Limited 12/01/2007  
317158 Clearpower Limited 27/11/2006  
350611 Aras Slainte Limited 30/11/2004  
419221 Vahalla Limited 30/05/2006  
428023 Stidel Nominees Limited 30/01/2007  
439005 Cove Capital Partners Limited 03/05/2007  
414384 Statefirst (Ireland) Limited 22/02/2007 20/03/2008
22045 Anglo Irish Bank Corporation Limited 12/10/2004 18/12/2008
428024 Vocalcom Limited 20/12/2006 22/12/2008
Buckley, Denis 111471 Kerry Group plc 12/12/2003  
160703 St. John’s Listowel Square Limited 30/09/2003  
185335 Remedios Limited 24/07/2003  
385948 One Fifty One plc 19/10/2005  
438545 One Fifty One Charitable Foundation 23/04/2007  
132287 Iaws Group Limited 24/06/1997 16/09/2008
233607 Cumann 17/12/2002 06/07/2006
Byrne, David 70576 Kingspan Group plc 01/01/2005  
81897 An Ceolaras Naisiunta - National Concert Hall Co. 02/06/2006  
320308 Colla Management Limited 22/09/2001  
397541 Pathwell Limited 09/02/2005  
222332 Irish Life & Permanent plc 15/12/2004 23/05/2008
Crowley, Laurence 18269 The Economic and Social Research Institute 16/01/2007  
20165 The Cheshire Foundation in Ireland 11/12/1998  
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NAME CO. NO. COMPANY NAME DIRECTOR SINCE
DIRECTOR 
UNTIL
27768 Ed. Macliammoir Dublin Gate Theatre Prods. Ltd 09/06/2001  
67345 O’Flaherty Holdings Limited 01/01/1992  
197150 The Economic and Social Research Trust 18/09/2007  
251020 Gaisce - Gradam An Uachtarain - Presidents Award 22/06/2005  
324061 Ecocem Materials Limited 01/08/2007  
324929 Pay and Shop Limited 01/06/2006  
366686 US-Ireland Alliance Limited 10/07/2007  
7356 Carraras (Ireland) Limited 26/11/1992 26/07/2006
19093 Rothmans of Pall Mall (Ireland) Ltd. 20/06/1997 26/07/2006
19402 Murray Tobacco Limited 26/11/1992 26/07/2006
30356 Elan Corporation plc 14/03/1996 22/05/2008
31692 William Ruddell Limited 26/11/1992 26/07/2006
38640 Bat Investments (Ireland) Limited 26/11/1992 26/07/2006
72194 Co-Operation Ireland 09/06/2006 03/04/2008
266667 University College Dublin Foundation Limited 21/05/1997 13/06/2007
8635 Wellington Montague  08/03/2007
67771 P.J. Carroll & Company Limited 19/04/1991 26/07/2006
Dilger, David John 1336 Food Industries Limited  - 31/03/2008
2783 D.E. Williams Ltd. 18/06/1996 31/03/2008
2784 B. Daly & Company Ltd. 18/06/1996 31/03/2008
4757 F.A. Waller & Col Limited 18/06/1996 31/03/2008
8532 Irish Sugar Limited 28/04/1993 31/03/2008
8594 Bermaline Limited 31/12/1992 30/08/2007
8673 Irish Malt Products Limited 29/03/1994 31/03/2008
8706 Ibec Limited 24/02/2004 27/09/2007
9031 Odlum Mills Limited 31/15/92 30/08/2007
13123 Greenvale Animal Feeds Manufacturing Ltd. 31/05/1995 21/03/2008
16701 Irish Malt Exports Limited 18/06/1996 31/03/2008
19681 Odlum Group 04/02/1992 30/08/2007
24023 Williams Group, Tullamore, Limited 18/06/1996 31/03/2008
24214 Interchem Limited 27/07/1994 31/03/2008
24563 Sugar Distributors (Handling) Ltd. 03/03/1993 31/03/2008
27443 Eirfreeze Limited  - 31/03/2008
36894 W.B. Nunn (1972) Limited 22/12/1997 31/03/2008
46871 Greentrack Limited 21/12/1990 30/08/2007
48903 Greencore Developments Limited 18/06/1996 31/03/2008
49330 Armer Salmon Limited 14/12/1992 31/03/2008
50903 Minch Malt Limited  - 31/03/2008
76754 Williams - Waller (Mullingar) Limited 18/06/1996 31/03/2008
93783 Drummonds Limited 01/08/1989 31/03/2008
93935 Sugar Distributors Limited 22/02/1993 31/03/2008
96089 Trilby Trading Limited 23/05/1992 01/02/2008
100207 Williams Waller (Edenderry) Limited 18/06/1996 31/03/2008
115923 Williams Waller (Trading) Limited 18/06/1996 31/03/2008
125813 zadkine Enterprises Limited 29/03/1994 31/03/2008
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NAME CO. NO. COMPANY NAME DIRECTOR SINCE
DIRECTOR 
UNTIL
137347 Williams Waller (Enfield) Limited 18/06/1996 31/03/2008
169188 Greencore Finance Limited 12/05/1992 31/03/2008
169758 Greencore Sugar Company 03/08/2006 31/03/2008
170116 Greencore Group plc 29/01/1992 31/03/2008
170912 Odlums Limited 31/12/1992 30/08/2007
170919 Hearts Delight Limited 31/12/1992 30/08/2007
172298 Minch Norton Limited 07/06/1991 31/03/2008
173715 Drumearl Limited 19/06/1991 31/03/2008
178399 Greencore Agrisales  Limited 24/04/1992 31/03/2008
178400 Greencore Agribusiness Limited 24/04/1992 31/03/2008
189728 Greencore Holdings Limited 10/06/1992 31/03/2008
201572 Midland Malting Research Limited 18/06/1996 31/03/2008
202953 Irish Sugar Research & Development Ltd. 08/06/1993 31/03/2008
208818 Greencore Holdings (Ireland) Limited 02/11/1993 31/03/2008
218251 Williams Waller (Milling) Limited 18/06/1996 31/03/2008
378022 Talroff Limited 12/11/2003 31/03/2008
315430 Wormegay Limited 23/12/1999 25/04/2005
Drury, Fintan 16956 Paddy Power plc 29/08/2002  
278326 Compupharma Limited 23/06/2000  
297411 Cappagrove Limited 05/01/1999  
304723 Eurocard (Ireland) Limited 06/04/1999  
314657 Dolphin Trolleys Limited 29/02/2000  
318580 Drury Hospitality Limited 17/01/2000  
413916 Andy Black Poker Limited 16/01/2006  
22045 Anglo Irish Bank Corporation Limited 30/05/2002 27/06/2008
308957 Maynooth University Foundation Limited 07/03/2000 30/09/2005
407227 Global Venues Limited 26/08/2005 13/11/2008
315508 Truro Limited 23/12/1999 25/04/2005
388680 Paddy Hogan Racing Limited 13/07/2004 26/07/2005
FitzGerald, Liam 12244 United Drug plc 23/10/1996  
78896 Oremelt Limited 03/09/2002  
80661 Intra Veno Healthcare Limited 03/09/2002  
108801 Novapath Supplies Limited 02/10/2000  
143028 United Drub (US) Holdings Limited 02/10/2000  
174071 Intra Pharma Limited 03/09/2002  
183870 J.V.A. Analytical Limited 13/12/2007  
216513 Dugdale Trading Limited 03/09/2002  
268341 United Drug Financial Services 20/07/2007  
305420 Ashfield Healthcare (Ireland) Limited 22/12/1999  
383466 C & C Gropu plc 30/04/2004  
426554 Traidlinks 15/09/2006  
FitzPatrick, Sean 42702 The Lithographic Group Limited 29/11/1989  
125910 Mac Communications Limited 24/04/1998  
433527 Smurfit Kappa Group plc 20/03/2007  
11804 Santain Developments Limited 24/03/2004 06/07/2007
59
Appendix 2: SoloCheck Data
NAME CO. NO. COMPANY NAME DIRECTOR SINCE
DIRECTOR 
UNTIL
11452 Irish Buyway Limited 01/10/1986 28/01/2005
13234 Ansbacher Bankers Limited 08/03/1996 28/01/2005
16086 Pegasus Nominees Limited 08/03/1996 28/01/2005
17042 Iboc Limited  28/01/2005
21795 Anglo Irish Bank Limited 01/08/1983 28/01/2005
22045 Anglo Irish Bank Corporation Limited 01/01/2005 18/12/2008
22732 Geranth Limited 08/03/1996 28/01/2005
22768 Buyway Group Limited  28/01/2005
34273 Fitzwilliam Leasing Limited 05/03/1996 28/01/2005
44430 Anglo-Irish Bank (Nominees) Limited 31/08/1983 28/01/2005
58312 C.F. Limited  28/01/2005
64851 Modify 5 Limited  28/01/2005
9215 Aer Lingus Limited 24/03/2004 18/12/2008
211168 Aer Lingus Group plc 11/03/2004 18/12/2008
338442 Business In the Community Limited 16/10/2003 14/01/2009
369222 Aragone Limited 31/03/2003 28/01/2005
160281 Duneast Limited 24/03/2004 06/07/2007
79914 Anglo Irish Corporate Bank Limited 31/03/1999 28/01/2005
104412 Anglo Irish International Finance 31/03/1999 28/01/2005
138992 Anglo Irish Financial Services Limited 13/01/1989 28/01/2005
167368 Anglo Irish International Financial Services Ltd. 05/04/1991 28/01/2005
170116 Greencore Group plc 01/01/2003 19/12/2008
170178 Anglo Irish Nominees Limited 31/03/1999 28/01/2005
176619 Pagnol Limited 27/09/1991 28/01/2005
312112 Anglo Irish Banl Esop Limited 10/12/1999 28/01/2005
355723 S & T Fitzpatrick Limited 15/04/2002 26/04/2005
358015 The Philippe Fund plc 14/06/2005 31/12/2008
370564 Lithographic Web Press Limited 22/05/2003 19/02/2007
Gray, Danuta 9215 Aer Lingus Limited 01/10/2007  
172162 Telefonica O2 Ireland Retail Limited 17/09/2001  
194322 The Barretstown  Gang Camp Fund Limited 08/11/2006  
211168 Aer Lingus Group plc 25/08/2006  
222332 Irish Life & Permanent plc 31/08/2004  
234895 Telefonica O2 Ireland Limited 28/06/2001  
235444 Cellular World Limited 30/03/2002  
245901 Centurion Colelctions Limited 16/08/2001  
269656 O2 Cellular Networks Ireland Limited 15/03/2002  
316428 O2 Communications 10/10/2002  
346320 Liffey Telecom Limited 15/03/2002  
347434 O2 Investments Ireland 05/09/2001  
421199 O2 Communications (Ireland) Limited 02/06/2006  
187172 Commercial Communications Sales Limited 30/03/2002  
315684 Eire Cumarsaide Teoranta 17/09/2001  
588 Dublin Chamber of Commerce (Incorporated) 30/04/2003 03/02/2005
243808 Feilte Dhuibh Linne Teoranta 28/01/2005 17/10/2008
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NAME CO. NO. COMPANY NAME DIRECTOR SINCE
DIRECTOR 
UNTIL
245649 Common Purpose (Ireland) Limited 10/12/2001 01/06/2005
338442 Business In the Community Limited 16/10/2003 06/12/2005
Haran, Paul 129933 Glanbia plc 09/06/2005  
438300 MP Healthcare 04/10/2007  
15151 Irish Management Institute 12/03/1998 30/09/2005
324045 Copperway 01/04/2005 01/06/2007
Heraty, Ann 156852 Computer Placement Limited 29/03/1990  
287278 Cpl Resources Public Limited Company 14/09/1998  
327484 Medical Recruitment Specialist Limited 20/03/2004  
398644 Richmond Recruitment Limited 03/03/2005  
400182 Occipital Limited 06/04/2005  
Kennedy, Gary 312641 Anam Mobile Limited 09/10/2007  
411528 Gary Kennedy & Associates Limited 28/11/2005  
279868 Galway University Foundation Limited 05/02/1998 03/10/2008
337612 Buyasyoufly Limited 01/03/2007 15/04/2009
Liston, Jerry 243397 Milltown Golf Club Trustees Limited 06/12/2007  
358433 BWG Group Limited 23/08/2002 13/10/2006
Lynch, Philip 135882 FBD Holdings plc 25/03/1996  
138108 Coillte Teoranta 20/04/2004  
146192 Irish Pride Bakeries 11/08/1989  
247374 Iaws Nominees Limited 12/04/1996  
347708 Renore Limited 05/08/2004  
383466 C & C Group plc 30/04/2004  
385948 One Fifty One plc 19/10/2005  
392378 Openhydro Group Limited 01/01/2007  
438545 One Fifty One Charitable Foundation 23/04/2007  
439145 One51 Es Metals (Ireland) Limited 20/09/2007  
439475 Moonduster Limited 10/05/2007  
23278 Malting Company of Ireland (1965) Limited 08/06/1994  
119695 Dempsey Drums Limited 30/09/2005  
283744 Cork Malting Company Limtied 29/04/1998  
339814 Waterford Irish Pubx Limited 02/02/2004  
1305 R & H Hall Limited 03/02/2006  
1945 Heiton Group, plc 05/11/2001 07/02/2005
12668 Power Seeds Limited 03/06/1992 03/02/2006
19681 Odlum Group 13/12/2001 27/10/2005
132287 Iaws Group, Limited 07/06/1988 03/12/2007
149525 Cuisine De France Limited 10/12/1997 03/02/2006
222332 Irish Life & Permanent plc 04/03/2003 20/05/2005
273542 Malting Company of Ireland Limited 12/12/1997 07/03/2005
316994 Whitway Limited 11/10/2005 06/12/2005
325906 Cullen Environmental Services Limited 30/09/2005 05/04/2006
339221 Cillryan’s Bakery Limited 06/03/2001 07/11/2005
362469 Lifestyle Foods Limited 10/140/02 03/02/2006
374837 Rilta Environmental Limited 30/09/2005 05/04/2006
61
Appendix 2: SoloCheck Data
NAME CO. NO. COMPANY NAME DIRECTOR SINCE
DIRECTOR 
UNTIL
374923 Mount Carmel Medical Group Limited 12/09/2005 24/11/2008
395392 Soils Environmental Services Limited 30/09/2005 05/04/2006
402298 Immark Ireland Limited 06/07/2005 03/07/2008
406479 Educate Through Sport Foundation 10/08/2005 20/11/2008
199397 Autorod Limited 30/09/2005 05/04/2006
419674 Dis Nordic Limited 08/05/2006 05/11/2007
McCann, Gary 12244 United Drug plc 28/09/2004  
259534 Atrium Property Developments Limited 30/05/2005  
306274 Balcuik Limited 30/05/2005  
398356 Tysan Investments Limited 30/05/2005  
446620 Noah’s Ark Montessory and Creche Limited 24/09/2007  
McCourt, Declan 36295 Daf Distributors Ireland Limited 01/03/1983  
38323 Daf Sales Limited 01/03/1983  
54546 Scanveco Limited 01/01/1992  
61150 Croxley Limited 01/03/1983  
62442 Cosford Limited 01/11/1983  
73342 Fyffes plc 03/04/2003  
92148 Irish Industrial Lift Trucks Limited   
94149 Armalou Limited 01/07/1987  
105452 Jaguar Daimler Ireland Limited   
107141 Hispano Cars Limited  
108518 The Mater Foundation 12/12/1989  
129195 Reloton Limited   
143055 Hillpath Limited 15/04/1989  
202992 Man Importers Ireland Limited 01/06/1993  
221044 Daf Ireland Limited 05/09/1994  
235350 C.J. Ireland Concessionaires Limited 19/07/1995  
236154 Daihatsu Ireland Limited 27/07/1995  
240772 Daf Holdings Limited 06/06/1997  
277225 Eii Voyager Fund plc 01/08/2003  
299868 Oakmill Limited 29/04/2003  
366985 Ohmput Limited 06/02/2003  
408838 Eii Real Estate Securities Advisors Ltd. 05/10/2005  
416433 Blackrock International Land plc 30/03/2006  
450693 Armalou Holdings 13/12/2007  
275178 GPA Fund Managers (Ireland) Ltd 11/12/2001  
109452 Daf Truck Services (Cork) Limited  31/10/2006
93320 Cork Truck Services Limited 01/01/1984 31/10/2006
McGowan, Kieran 12244 United Drug plc 14/04/1999  
12956 CRH plc 15/10/1998  
30356 Elan Corporation plc 01/01/1999  
50074 CRH Finance Limited 06/04/1999  
282849 Drury Communications (Holdings) Limited 10/12/1998  
300641 Charles Schwab Asset Management (Ireland) Limited 31/03/1999  
300943 Charles Schwab Worldwide Funds plc 31/03/1999  
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UNTIL
338442 Business In the Community Limited 14/09/2004  
428013 US Trust Global Investment Series plc 07/11/2006  
370095 Aberdeen Asset Allocation Overlay Fund PLC 24/04/2003  
139459 Drury Communications Limited 10/12/1998 10/05/2007
222332 Irish Life & Permanent plc 21/04/1999 17/11/2008
295465 Integrated Business Exchange Limited 05/05/1999 21/01/2006
180256 Aberdeen Funds PLC 22/01/1999 30/06/2007
210536 Aberdeen Fixed Income Funds Plc 22/01/1999 30/06/2007
290368 Aberdeen Globalspectrum Funds PLC 22/01/1999 30/06/2007
345640 Aberdeen Gmas Funds PLC 20/07/2001 30/06/2007
345642 Aberdeen Balenced Asset Allocation PLC 20/07/2001 30/06/2007
404534 Aberdeen Portable Alpha Funds PLC 01/07/2005 30/06/2007
404535 ABERDEEN Portable Alpha Funds 1 PLC 01/07/2005 30/06/2007
180255 Aberdeen Investment Funds PLC 22/01/1999 30/06/2007
198908 Aberdeen Profunds PLC 22/01/1999 30/06/2007
218935 Aberdeen Global Select Funds PLC 22/01/1999 30/06/2007
250659 Aberdeen Cash and Money Market Fund PLC 22/01/1999 30/06/2007
McGuckian, John 41043 Irish Continental Group plc   
440961 TVC Holdings plc 15/06/2007  
6022 Munster and Leinster Bank Limited  05/10/2007
24173 Allied Irish Banks plc 18/03/825 09/05/2007
12128 Unidare plc 16/05/1991 22/05/2006
McLaughlin, Kyran 330569 Batistuta 02/10/2000  
46436 Anthony Nichols Limited   
104547 Ryanair Limited 01/01/2001  
160627 Citywest Limited 12/01/1993  
306430 Beregono Limited 27/05/1999  
361575 Ailman Limited 17/09/2002  
361577 Ailnew Limited 17/09/2002  
148223 Davy International Financial Services 27/04/1998 14/09/2005
Molloy, Patrick 87522 Blackrock Hospital Limited 14/02/1996  
87523 Blackrock Clinic Limited 14/02/1996  
11861 Waterford Wedgwood plc 25/07/2002  
Moran, Thomas 9215 Aer Lingus Limited 01/10/2007  
211168 Aer Lingus Group plc 25/08/2006  
Murphy, William 48563 Seville Lodge Trust 16/06/2005  
48757 D. Walsh & Sons Limited 12/12/2005  
51144 S O S Kilkenny Limited 07/04/1997  
84321 Grassland Fertilizers (Kilkenny) Limited 16/12/2005  
86609 Grassland Fertilizers Kilkenny (Sales) Ltd. 16/12/2005  
94684 Barley Exports Limited 13/06/1983  
129933 Glanbia plc 01/06/1989  
243096 D Walsh and Sons Manufacturing Limited 16/12/2005  
262514 South East Port Services Limited 16/12/2005  
376398 Simon Community (South East) Limited 17/01/2007  
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420933 SOS Kilkenny Housing Association Limited 30/05/2006  
442721 Orbit Outreach Services Limtied 04/07/2007  
443252 South East Port Investments Limited 17/07/2007  
132287 Iaws Group Limited 15/10/1997 16/09/2008
O’Connor, Daniel Noel 12965 CRH plc 28/06/2006  
24173 Allied Irish Banks plc 11/01/2007  
430160 Deerfield Farm Services 23/11/2006  
Pratt, Maurice 8545 Bank of Scotland (Ireland) Limited 07/04/2006  
19632 Brown Thomas Group Limited 31/10/2006  
31309 Carlow Investment Company 31/10/2006  
224324 Uniphar Public Limited Company 01/07/2003  
338442 Business In the Community Limited 22/03/2006  
588 Dublin Chamber of Commerce (Incorporated) 21/03/2000 01/02/2007
1367 Thwaites Limited 28/01/2002 28/11/2008
1393 Grands of Ireland Limited 28/01/2002 28/11/2008
1636 C&C Management Services 2007 Limited 28/01/2002 28/11/2008
1674 Britvic Munster Limited 28/01/2002 29/08/2007
1986 Bulmers Limited 28/01/2002 28/11/2008
2311 Britvic Northern Ireland Limited 28/01/2002 29/08/2007
2547 C & C International Limited 28/01/2002 28/11/2008
3673 Wm. Magner Limited 28/01/2002 28/11/2008
7661 Britvic Ireland Limtied 28/01/2002 29/08/2007
8706 Ibec Limited 01/11/2004 27/09/2007
9387 Showerings (Ireland) Limited 28/01/2002 28/11/2008
11363 Fruit of the Vine Limited 28/02/2002 28/11/2008
12262 Irish Mist Liquer Company Limited 28/01/2002 28/11/2008
12888 M. O’Sullivan & Sons Limited 28/01/2002 28/11/2008
14271 William J. Dwan & Sons Limited 28/01/2002 29/08/2007
15735 Tayto Crisps Limited 28/01/2002 21/09/2006
16068 Britvic Licensed Wholesale Limited 28/01/2002 29/08/2007
16599 C&C Group Irish Holdings Limited 28/01/2002 28/11/2008
16738 Potato Distributers Limited 28/01/2002 21/09/2006
18749 Eurosax International Limited 28/01/2002 21/09/2006
22903 C&C Agencies Limited 28/01/2002 28/11/2008
27610 Edward and John Burke (1968) Limited 28/01/2002 28/11/2008
27892 Findlater (Wine Merchants) Limited 28/01/2002 28/11/2008
28114 Britvic Limited 28/02/2002 29/08/2007
37521 Sooner Foods (Ireland) Limited 28/01/2002 21/09/2006
39105 Britvic Logistics Limited 28/01/2002 29/08/2007
39840 King Foods Limited 28/01/2002 21/09/2006
40077 C & C Priofit Sharing Trustee Limited 28/01/2002 28/11/2008
46484 King Kandy Limited 28/01/2002 21/09/2006
50842 King Foods (Export) Limited 28/01/2002 21/09/2006
64397 T J Carolan & Son Limited 28/01/2002 28/11/2008
65240 John Mulligan & Sons Limited 28/01/2002 29/08/2007
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NAME CO. NO. COMPANY NAME DIRECTOR SINCE
DIRECTOR 
UNTIL
76681 Lough Corrib Mineral Water Company Ltd. 28/01/2002 28/11/2008
88958 Ballygowan Limited 28/01/2002 29/08/2007
98789 Eircom Limited 18/03/2004 18/08/2006
113323 C & C Investments Limited 28/01/2002 28/11/2008
122253 C & C Group Pension Trust (No. 2) Limited 28/02/2002 28/11/2008
126575 Aquaporte Limited 28/01/2002 29/08/2007
143745 Magners Irish Cider Limited 28/01/2002 28/11/2008
144987 Cantrell & Cochrane Limited 28/01/2002 28/11/2008
242159 Redpak Limited 09/10/1998 08/06/2005
289782 C & C (Holdings) Limited 28/01/2002 28/11/2008
298420 Venentia Telecommunications 18/03/2004 18/08/2006
305290 Bouchel Limited 28/01/2002 28/11/2008
309840 Tayto Limited 28/01/2002 21/09/2006
309842 Bestormel Limited 28/01/2002 28/11/2008
310268 Cravenby Limited 28/01/2002 28/11/2008
329392 Vandamin Limited 28/04/2002 28/11/2008
357222 C & C Group International Holdings Ltd. 22/05/2002 28/11/2008
383466 C & C Group plc 30/04/2004 28/11/2008
433458 Vinitrading Limited 30/03/2007 13/09/2008
315494 Littlemill Limited 23/12/1999 25/04/2005
357322 Bewdley Limited 04/06/2002 07/12/2007
Roche, Donal 25552 Rockhill Investment Company 27/11/1980  
207928 Abso Limited 09/10/1993  
239480 Dps Engineering & Construction Limited 01/12/2005  
253811 McInerney Holdings plc 08/02/2005  
325209 Questwell Limited 01/12/2000  
385008 Dps Engineering Hlldings Limited 06/09/2005  
396330 Barclays Bank Ireland plc 15/15/05  
124258 Borris in Ossory Investments Limited 24/01/1989  
153189 Sundene (Ireland) Limited 30/05/1995  
206222 Darcari Limited 13/08/1993  
397783 Hillrock Developments Limited 15/02/2005  
109335 Matheson Ormsby Prentice Support Services 15/06/1987 01/02/2005
363853 Newcourt Gruop plc 28/11/2002 22/09/2005
98789 Eircom Limited 18/03/2004 18/08/2006
298420 Valentia Telecommunications 18/03/2004 18/08/2006
364773 Appian Asset Managemetn Limtied 06/12/2002 07/07/2009
378730 Teva Pharmaceuticals Finance Ireland Ltd 28/11/2003 27/05/2005
379908 Teva Pharmaceuticals Finance Irelnad Ii Limited 23/15/2003 27/05/2005
394759 Knocktarna Limited 06/12/2004 05/04/2005
Somers, Bernard 41043 Irish Continental Group plc 08/03/2004  
54858 DCC plc 29/09/2003  
154148 Commerzbank Europe (Ireland) 30/04/1991  
218635 Eurotel Marketing Limited 22/09/1994  
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241427 World 2000 Entertainment Limited 30/01/1996  
244914 Maudlines Investments Limited 20/03/1996  
246742 Foxgrange Limited 01/05/1996  
251189 Balmerino Limited 17/10/1996  
268370 Educational Multimedia Corporation Ireland Ltd. 15/07/1998  
269885 Educational Multimedia Group Ltd. 14/07/1998  
273679 World Media Services Ltd. 24/08/2002  
289132 Kalweni Limited 01/10/1998  
305825 Etel management Services Ltd. 21/06/1999  
362803 Planet Party Limited 18/02/2003  
440863 Escher Group Holdings Ltd. 14/09/2007  
159664 Concept Catering Ltd. 05/11/1994  
273604 Herbert Film & TV Productions Ltd. 10/10/1997  
313456 World 2000 Entertainment Music Publishing Limited 18/04/2002  
325429 Kardony Limited 08/04/2000  
345253 Passage East Capital Partners Limited 06/07/2001  
364773 Appian Asset Management Limited 23/01/2004 08/09/2006
163921 Cominvest Asset Management Ltd. 01/11/1990 30/01/2008
119513 Numed Research and Development Ltd. 01/08/1989 20/01/2005
193813 Cicm International Portfolios plc 15/10/1992 13/09/2007
2936 Independent news & Media plc 21/05/1997 30/04/2009
7446 South Wharf Limited 06/03/1998 29/01/2007
24173 Allied Irish Banks plc 07/09/2006 31/12/2008
331898 Irish Centre for Parentally Abducted Children 01/09/2000 19/08/2005
382427 Pcpone 27/02/2004 19/09/2008
391746 Champion Sports Ireland 26/10/2006 19/09/2008
177263 Cominvest Global Funds plc 01/08/1991 12/11/2007
219176 Adig Clients plc 12/02/1996 24/02/2006
254665 Cicm Global Portfolios plc 13/12/1996 13/09/2007
292038 CbVermogensverwaltung plc 14/01/1999 13/09/2007
305777 Adig Sector plc 03/06/1999 02/05/2006
Members of Director Network were identified from SoloCheck data on the basis of a match of name aND date of birth.
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Total Remuneration includes Salary, Fees, Pension Contributions, Taxable Benefits, Profits shares 
and Bonuses in the annual reports.
Total Board Members covers all financial details of the board of directors remuneration given in 
the annual reports unless other details are stated, i.e. ex-officio member.
ORGANISATION YEAR P/P ROLE AMOUNT
Aer Lingus 2005 Private Chairperson €272,000
2006 Private Chairperson €86,000
2007 Private Chairperson €175,000
2005 Private Executive director €302,500
2006 Private Executive director €154,000
2007 Private Executive director €515,000
2005 Private Ex-officio member €206,000
2006 Private Ex-officio member €982,000
2007 Private Ex-officio member €1,115,000
2005 Private NED €21,800
2006 Private NED €13,250
2007 Private NED €44,444
AIB 2005 Private Chairperson €375,000
2006 Private Chairperson €408,000
2007 Private Chairperson €475,000
2005 Private Executive director €1,714,000
2006 Private Executive director €1,525,000
2007 Private Executive director €1,443,333
2005 Private Ex-officio member €1,104,000
2006 Private Ex-officio member €2,436,000
2007 Private Ex-officio member €2,105,000
2005 Private NED €93,555
2006 Private NED €85,800
2007 Private NED €76,417
Anglo Irish Bank 2005 Private Chairperson €167,000
2006 Private Chairperson €363,000
2007 Private Chairperson €431,000
2005 Private Executive director €1,426,500
2006 Private Executive director €961,400
2007 Private Executive director €1,307,750
2005 Private Ex-officio member €2,354,000
2006 Private Ex-officio member €3,015,000
2007 Private Ex-officio member €3,274,000
2005 Private NED €66,333
2006 Private NED €68,500
2007 Private NED €76,375
Bank of Ireland 2005 Private Chairperson €419,000
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2006 Private Chairperson €336,000
2007 Private Chairperson €483,000
2005 Private Executive director €558,000
2006 Private Executive director €115,000
2007 Private Executive director €1,243,750
2005 Private Ex-officio member €1,919,000
2006 Private Ex-officio member €2,525,000
2007 Private Ex-officio member €3,998,000
2005 Private NED €77,384
2006 Private NED €77,583
2007 Private NED €79,666
C&C 2006 Private Chairperson €190,000
2007 Private Chairperson €197,000
2006 Private Executive director €539,667
2007 Private Executive director €782,333
2006 Private Ex-officio member €1,200,000
2007 Private Ex-officio member €1,406,000
2006 Private NED €58,667
2007 Private NED €66,666
CRH 2005 Private Chairperson €350,000
2006 Private Chairperson €375,000
2007 Private Chairperson €315,000
2005 Private Ex -Officio Member €1,925,000
2006 Private Ex -Officio Member €2,656,000
2007 Private Ex -Officio Member €2,794,000
2005 Private Executive director €1,130,250
2006 Private Executive director €1,217,000
2007 Private Executive director €1,291,666
2005 Private NED €67,625
2006 Private NED €72,625
2007 Private NED €100,000
DCC 2005 Private Chairperson €130,000
2006 Private Chairperson €142,000
2007 Private Chairperson €153,000
2005 Private Executive director €505,250
2006 Private Executive director €692,000
2007 Private Executive director €527,666
2005 Private Ex-officio member €1,304,000
2006 Private Ex-officio member €1,625,000
2007 Private Ex-officio member €1,520,000
2005 Private NED €54,750
2006 Private NED €51,666
2007 Private NED €64,000
Dragon Oil 2005 Private Chairperson US$2,957,000
2006 Private Chairperson US $389,000
2007 Private Chairperson US $1,492,000
2005 Private Ex-officio member US $783,000
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2005 Private NED US $352,000
2006 Private NED US $53,000
2007 Private NED US $131,500
Eircom 2005 Private Chairperson €132,500
2006 Private Chairperson €132,500
2005 Private Executive director €743,705
2006 Private Executive director €916,407
2005 Private NED €70,367
2006 Private NED €78,875
Elan 2005 Private Chairperson US $300,000
2006 Private Chairperson US $300,000
2007 Private Chairperson US $300,000
2005 Private Executive director US $730,884
2006 Private Executive director US $948,478
2007 Private Executive director US $1,818,332
2005 Private Ex-officio member US $1,793,315
2006 Private Ex-officio member US $1,796,533
2007 Private Ex-officio member US $1,959,690
2005 Private NED US $59,240
2006 Private NED US $65,893
2007 Private NED US $58,121
Fyffes 2005 Private Chairperson €1,505,000
2006 Private Chairperson €801,000
2007 Private Chairperson €946,000
2005 Private Executive director €704,000
2006 Private Executive director €406,500
2007 Private Executive director €584,000
2005 Private Ex-officio member €1,505,000
2006 Private Ex-officio member €668,000
2007 Private Ex-officio member €677,000
2005 Private NED €55,166
2006 Private NED €60,000
2007 Private NED €43,333
Glanbia 2005 Private Chairperson €57,000
2006 Private Chairperson €80,000
2007 Private Chairperson €85,000
2007 Private Ex -Officio Member €1,194,000
2005 Private Executive director €441,000
2006 Private Executive director €587,000
2007 Private Executive director €816,000
2005 Private Ex-officio member €642,000
2006 Private Ex-officio member €927,000
2005 Private NED €22,444
2006 Private NED €25,947
2007 Private NED €29,777
Grafton Group 2007 Private Chairperson €864,000
2005 Private Chairperson €871,000
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2006 Private Chairperson €965,000
2005 Private Executive director €639,333
2006 Private Executive director €718,667
2007 Private Executive director €639,333
2005 Private NED €70,000
2006 Private NED €60,000
2007 Private NED €70,000
Greencore 2005 Private Chairperson €170,000
2006 Private Chairperson €200,000
2007 Private Chairperson €200,000
2005 Private Executive director €345,833
2006 Private Executive director €605,000
2007 Private Executive director €858,333
2005 Private Ex-officio member €884,000
2006 Private Ex-officio member €1,033,000
2007 Private Ex-officio member €1,447,000
2005 Private NED €41,142
2006 Private NED €51,666
2007 Private NED €51,666
IAWS 2005 Private Chairperson €40,000
2006 Private Chairperson €187,000
2007 Private Chairperson €200,000
2005 Private Executive director €435,666
2006 Private Executive director €725,000
2007 Private Executive director €984,666
2005 Private Ex-officio member €1,121,000
2006 Private Ex-officio member €1,176,000
2007 Private Ex-officio member €1,608,000
2005 Private NED €38,181
2006 Private NED €59,400
2007 Private NED €59,444
ICG 2005 Private Chairperson €90,000
2006 Private Chairperson €90,000
2007 Private Chairperson €240,000
2005 Private Executive director €284,000
2006 Private Executive director €349,000
2007 Private Executive director €432,000
2005 Private Ex-officio member €664,000
2006 Private Ex-officio member €1,001,000
2007 Private Ex-officio member €1,422,000
2005 Private NED €40,000
2006 Private NED €40,000
2007 Private NED €135,000
Independent News & Media 2005 Private Chairperson €133,000
2007 Private Chairperson €154,000
2006 Private Chariperson €155,000
2005 Private Executive director €1,104,250
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2006 Private Executive Director €1,285,000
2007 Private Executive director €1,443,000
2005 Private Ex-officio member €1,467,000
2006 Private Ex-officio member €1,817,000
2007 Private Ex-officio member €2,205,000
2005 Private NED €88,000
2006 Private NED €114,538
2007 Private NED €105,142
Irish Life and Permanent 2005 Private Chairperson €240,000
2006 Private Chairperson €300,000
2007 Private Chairperson €320,000
2005 Private Executive director €529,500
2006 Private Executive director €657,000
2007 Private Executive director €737,000
2005 Private Ex-officio member €1,138,000
2006 Private Ex-officio member €1,335,000
2007 Private Ex-officio member €1,362,000
2005 Private NED €64,857
2006 Private NED €74,714
2007 Private NED €84,143
Kerry Group 2005 Private Chairperson €170,000
2006 Private Chairperson €190,000
2007 Private Chairperson €200,000
2005 Private Executive director €791,250
2006 Private Executive director €759,500
2007 Private Executive director €1,025,250
2005 Private Ex-officio member €1,201,000
2006 Private Ex-officio member €1,073,000
2007 Private Ex-officio member €140,000
2005 Private NED €41,126
2006 Private NED €49,877
2007 Private NED €53,619
Kingspan 2005 Private Chairperson €150,000
2006 Private Chairperson €158,000
2007 Private Chairperson €177,000
2005 Private Executive director €584,500
2006 Private Executive director €687,000
2007 Private Executive director €717,833
2005 Private Ex-officio member €719,000
2006 Private Ex-officio member €862,000
2007 Private Ex-officio member €1,261,000
2005 Private NED €51,167
2006 Private NED €58,000
2007 Private NED €55,714
McInerney Holdings 2005 Private Chairperson €88,825
2006 Private Chairperson €92,289
2007 Private Chairperson €120,000
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2005 Private Executive director €587,483
2006 Private Executive director €717,133
2007 Private Executive director €745,052
2005 Private Ex-officio member €956,689
2006 Private Ex-officio member €1,124,569
2007 Private Ex-officio member €1,183,216
2005 Private NED €50,192
2006 Private NED €56,703
2007 Private NED €58,496
Paddy Power 2005 Private Chairperson €110,000
2006 Private Chairperson €160,000
2007 Private Chairperson €160,000
2005 Private Executive director €802,333
2006 Private Executive director €456,500
2007 Private Executive director €596,000
2005 Private Ex-officio member €301,000
2006 Private Ex-officio member €1,248,000
2007 Private Ex-officio member €1,334,000
2005 Private NED €43,000
2006 Private NED €54,333
2007 Private NED €76,400
Ryanair 2005 Private Chairperson €0
2006 Private Chairperson €0
2007 Private Chairperson €0
2005 Private Ex-officio member €686,000
2006 Private Ex-officio member €837,000
2007 Private Ex-officio member €992,000
2005 Private NED €45,714
2006 Private NED €43,571
2007 Private NED €41,571
Smurfit 2006 Private Chairperson NA
2007 Private Chairperson €250,000
2006 Private Executive director €1,851,500
2007 Private Executive director €1,637,500
2006 Private Ex-officio member €2,574,000
2007 Private Ex-officio member €2,593,000
2006 Private NED NA
2007 Private NED €261,250
Tullow Oil 2005 Private Chairperson UK £110,000
2006 Private Chairperson UK £125,000
2007 Private Chairperson UK £150,000
2005 Private Executive director UK £460,661
2006 Private Executive director UK £396,499
2007 Private Executive director UK £665,987
2005 Private Ex-officio member UK £855,830
2006 Private Ex-officio member UK £1,097,645
2007 Private Ex-officio member UK £1,285,121
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2005 Private NED UK £36,500
2006 Private NED UK £38,066
2007 Private NED UK £47,600
United Drug 2005 Private Chairperson €67,000
2006 Private Chairperson €150,000
2007 Private Chairperson €150,000
2005 Private Executive director €387,500
2006 Private Executive director €395,333
2007 Private Executive director €612,667
2005 Private Ex-officio member €577,000
2006 Private Ex-officio member €695,000
2007 Private Ex-officio member €1,145,000
2005 Private NED €67,666
2006 Private NED €58,000
2007 Private NED €58,000
An Post 2005 State Chairperson NA
2006 State Chairperson NA
2007 State Chairperson NA
2005 State Ex-officio member €416,000
2006 State Ex-officio member €481,000
2007 State Ex-officio member €523,000
2005 State NED Total Board Fees €200,000
2006 State NED Total Board Fees €262,000
2007 State NED Total Board Fees €272,000
Bord Gais 2005 State Chairperson NA
2006 State Chairperson NA
2007 State Chairperson NA
2005 State Ex-officio member €316,000
2006 State Ex-officio member €322,000
2007 State Ex-officio member €461,000
2005 State NED Total Board Fees €103,000
2006 State NED Total Board Fees €157,000
2007 State NED Total Board Fees €134,000
Bord Na Mona 2005 State Chairperson NA
2006 State Chairperson NA
2007 State Chairperson NA
2005 State Executive director €322,000
2006 State Executive director €365,000
2007 State Executive director €365,000
2005 State NED Total Board Fees €310,000
2006 State NED Total Board Fees €416,000
2007 State NED Total Board Fees €354,000 
Central Bank of Ireland 2005 State Ex-officio member €320,771
2006 State Ex-officio member €351,125
2007 State Ex-officio member €368,703
2005 State NED Total Board Fees €101,579
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2006 State NED Total Board Fees €137,083
2007 State NED Total Board Fees €140,000
CIE 2005 State Executive Chairperson €220,627
2006 State Executive Chairperson €262,707
2007 State Executive Chairperson €264,990
2005 State NED Total Board Fees €313,396
2006 State NED Total Board Fees €657,000
2007 State NED Total Board Fees €657,000
Dublin Airport Authority 2005 State Chairperson NA
2006 State Chairperson NA
2007 State Chairperson NA
2005 State Ex-officio member €331,000
2006 State Ex-officio member €688,000
2007 State Ex-officio member €698,000
2005 State NED Total Board Fees €219,000
2006 State NED Total Board Fees €210,000
2007 State NED Total Board Fees €328,000
Dublin Docklands 
Development Authority
2005 State Chairperson NA
2006 State Chairperson NA
2007 State Chairperson NA
2005 State Ex-officio member NA
2006 State Ex-officio member NA
2007 State Ex-officio member NA
2005 State NED Total Board Fees €76,184
2006 State NED Total Board Fees €108,000
2007 State NED Total Board Fees €102,937
EirGrid 2005 State Chairperson €15,237
2006 State Chairperson €24,000
2007 State Chairperson €24,000
2005 State Ex-officio member €148,000
2006 State Ex-officio member €304,000
2007 State Ex-officio member €325,000
2005 State NED €10,158
2006 State NED €14,000
2007 State NED €14,000
Enterprise Ireland 2005 State Chairperson €15,267
2006 State Chairperson €23,917
2007 State Chairperson €23,917
2006 State Executive Director €199,356
2007 State Executive Director €163,219
2005 State Executive Directors €183,099
2005 State Ex-officio member €218,618
2006 State Ex-officio member €247,937
2007 State Ex-officio member €251,366
2005 State NED €7,634
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2006 State NED €9,435
2007 State NED €8,573
ESB 2005 State Chairperson €71,478
2006 State Chairperson €68,936
2007 State Chairperson €114,706
2005 State Ex-officio member €477,650
2006 State Ex-officio member €495,227
2007 State Ex-officio member €534,998
2005 State NED €11,716
2006 State NED €15,558
2007 State NED €13,966
FAS 2005 State Chairperson NA
2006 State Chairperson NA
2007 State Chairperson NA
2005 State Executive director NA
2006 State Executive director NA
2007 State Executive director NA
2005 State Ex-officio member NA
2006 State Ex-officio member NA
2007 State Ex-officio member NA
2005 State NED Total Board Fees €159,000
2006 State NED Total Board Fees €205,000
2007 State NED Total Board Fees €198,000
Forfas 2005 State Chairperson NA
2006 State Chairperson NA
2007 State Chairperson NA
2005 State Ex-officio member NA
2006 State Ex-officio member NA
2007 State Ex-officio member NA
2005 State NED Total Board Fees €301,000
2006 State NED Total Board Fees €371,000
2007 State NED Total Board Fees €391,000
IDA Ireland 2005 State Chairperson NA
2006 State Chairperson NA
2007 State Chairperson NA
2005 State Ex-officio Member NA
2006 State Ex-officio member NA
2007 State Ex-Officio Member NA
2005 State NED Total Board Fees €356,000
2006 State NED Total Board Fees €440,000
2007 State NED Total Board Fees €487,000
Irish Aviation Authority 2007 State Chairperson NA
2007 State Ex-officio member €350,000
2007 State NED Total Board Fees €126,000
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